The First Amendment in an Age of Paratroopers by Skover, David & Collins, Ronald
Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons 
Faculty Scholarship 
1-1-1990 
The First Amendment in an Age of Paratroopers 
David Skover 
Ronald Collins 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/faculty 
 Part of the First Amendment Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the Science and Technology 
Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David Skover and Ronald Collins, The First Amendment in an Age of Paratroopers, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1087 
(1990). 
https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/faculty/651 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Seattle University School of 
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact coteconor@seattleu.edu. 
Texas Law Review
Volume 68, Number 6, May 1990
The First Amendment in an Age of
Paratrooperst
Ronald K.L. Collins* & David M. Skover**
"We cannot hope simply to retain our old prerogatives. Our
bridges are gone and the Rubicon is yet to cross? We have either
to assume a large new role or to abdicate entirely. It is the age of
paratroopers."
- Marshall McLuhan1
McLuhan's metaphor is an invitation and, at the same time, a warn-
ing. It is a call to action and a question. In the context of the first
amendment, the metaphor is particularly powerful: it challenges us to
cross the Rubicon into a hostile territory of jurisprudence.
Today's first-amendment theory is largely the province of a concep-
t Copyright © 1990 Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover. This is the first installment of
a much larger work in progress entitled The Death of Discourse. The next installments, Electronic
Texts and The Death of Discourse, address various points raised in this Article.
* Visiting Associate Professor, Catholic University School of Law (1990-1991). B.A. 1971,
University of California; J.D. 1975, Loyola University.
** Associate Professor, University of Puget Sound School of Law. A.B. 1974, Princeton Uni-
versity; J.D. 1978, Yale University.
We are grateful to a number of our friends and colleagues who provided thoughtful, and some-
times even critical, comments: Suzanne Singer, John Scanlan, Pierre Schlag, Eric Chiappinelli,
Steven Pressman, Daniel Barbiero, Linda Hirshman, Chris Rideout, Burt Wechsler, George Anas-
taplo, H. Jefferson Powell, Jill Ramsfield, Antonia Fondaras, Joe Goffman, and Charles Reich.
1. Forsdale, Marshall McLuhan and the Rules of the Game, in MARSHALL McLUHAN: THE
MAN AND His MESSAGE 169, 173 (G. Sanderson & F. MacDonald eds. 1989) (quoting M.
McLuhan, Educational Effects of the Mass Media of Communication (1955) (seminar paper
presented at Teacher's College, Columbia University)). To "cross the Rubicon" means "to take an
irrevocable step." Historically, the Rubicon was a small river that separated ancient Italy from
Cisalpine Gaul (the province allotted to Julius Caesar). When Caesar crossed this stream in 49 B.C.,
he passed beyond the limits of his province and became an invader in Italy, thus precipitating war
with Pompey and the Senate. See BREWER'S DICTIONARY OF PHRASE AND FABLE 973 (1981).
In this Article, we appropriate McLuhan's language and apply it in ways that he probably
would not endorse. For a justification of such practices, see M. LERNER, IDEAS ARE WEAPONS:
THE HISTORY AND USES OF IDEAS 6 (1939) ("For in the history of ideas even their distortions are a
part of their meaning-the unfolding of a line of direction inherent in the ideas themselves.").
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tion of freedom of expression grounded in eighteenth-century fears of
government's tyrannical censorship. This theory, we maintain, is ill-
equipped to deal with a distinct tyranny in late twentieth-century
America, a tyranny playing upon the public's insatiable appetite for
amusement. Crossing the Rubicon requires understanding the differ-
ences between the old and new tyrannies, and appreciating the complexi-
ties of developing first-amendment principles to suit a new cultural
environment. Those who attempt such a venture are the first-amend-
ment paratroopers of our time, the ones who realize that we cannot re-
tain our old constitutional prerogatives in a transformed world.
Today the forces of capitalism encourage exploitation of highly ad-
vanced electronic technology to accelerate the age-old human drive for
self-gratification. The consumptive thrust of unchecked capitalism af-
fects all public discourse. This phenomenon is most apparent in the cul-
ture of commercial television, a culture in which America's most beloved
toy provides unceasing mass amusement. Essentially, "the predicament
of American television is the predicament of American culture and poli-
tics as a whole."' 2 Public discourse is increasingly taking a distinctive
and aestheticized form consistent with the look and feel of commercial
television. The aestheticization of public discourse is essential to the ef-
fective marketing of ideas and commercial goods in a highly consumptive
economy: marketing is, after all, essentially a selling of image. The busi-
ness of television trades in the economy of such images and has pulled
other discourse into that economy. With entertainment as the paradigm
for most public discourse, traditional first-amendment values-which
stress civic restraint 3 and serious dialogue-are overshadowed. Given
these core values and the anticensorial direction of first-amendment the-
ory, is there anything that could (or should) be done to thwart, rather
than to feed, an amusement-centered culture?
In attempting to answer this question, we confront a paradox: by
saving itself, the first amendment destroys itself. On the one hand, to
preserve its anticensorial ideals, the first amendment must protect both
the old and new media cultures. Accordingly, it must constrain most
governmental controls over expression, including those over the commer-
2. T. GITLIN, INSIDE PRIME TIME 335 (1983).
3. Civic restraint is not, of course, incompatible with radical political expression, which takes
politics most seriously in a way that an entertainment culture simply does not. See, eg., S. SHIF-
FRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY AND ROMANCE (forthcoming 1990) (characterizing
the first amendment's "free speech idea" as "one of our foremost cultural symbols"). Professor
Shiffrin maintains that "as a cultural symbol, the first amendment has enlivened, encouraged, and
sponsored the rebellious instincts within us all. It affords a positive boost to the dissenters and the
rebels." Id. Shiffrin contrasts this with the "hedonistic consumer" television culture. Id.
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cial use of electronic media. On the other hand, if the first amendment's
protections do not differentiate between the old and new media cultures,
the modem obsession with self-amusement will trivialize public discourse
and undermine the traditional aim of the first amendment. Differentia-
tion requires government "abridgment" of expression, particularly in the
case of commercial television. In the case of government abridgment,
first-amendment protection collapses into first-amendment tyranny; in
the case of anticensorial ideals, first-amendment liberty collapses into
first-amendment triviality.
Throughout this Article, our analysis of contemporary public dis-
course focuses mainly on the ecology of commercial television. We chose
this focus because television enjoys a dominant and almost unchallenged
status in our society. In assessing the function of first-amendment juris-
prudence, we simply cannot ignore that Americans own some 150 mil-
lion televisions, 4 that sixty-five percent of American households are
equipped with VCRs,5 that our people are tuned into a television set on
the average of forty-seven hours weekly, 6 that our young consume one
hundred commercials daily,7 that advertisers spend nearly twenty-three
billion dollars annually on television commercials, 8 and that the televi-
sion culture is first and foremost one of amusement.
Part I of this Article examines what we consider to be the "new
pleasure principle" and its relationship to the first amendment. We ex-
plain this relationship with reference to the cautionary tales of George
Orwell and Aldous Huxley. Part II reflects on the attributes and com-
mercial use of television as they relate to the Huxleyan pleasure princi-
ple. Part III describes three prototypical responses to the first-
amendment dilemmas posed in Part I. Each of these responses attempts
4. See Cutler, Meet Jane Doe, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS MAG., June 1989, at 25, 26.
5. See Stack, New Uses for Video-It's Everywhere, S.F. Chronicle, June 30, 1989, at El, col. 5
(describing how ubiquitous video technology is now being used to tape weddings, instruct police
officers, and create video magazines, among other things).
6. See J. MEYROWITZ, No SENSE OF PLACE: THE IMPACT OF ELECTRONIC MEDIA ON SO-
CIAL BEHAVIOR 79-80 (1985) (noting past studies revealing that households with incomes under
$10,000 watch an average of 47 hours and 3 minutes of television a week; households with incomes
over $30,000 watch television 47 hours and 50 minutes a week). According to the Nielson 1988
Report on Television, even the lowest viewing group--single-person households-had their sets on
37 1/2 hours a week. See NIELSON MEDIA RESEARCH, 1988 REPORT ON TELEVISION 7 (1988).
7. See Verhovek, New York Bans Sponsored TV From Its Schools, N.Y. Times, June 17, 1989,
at 1, col. 6 (reporting attempt of Whittle Communications to gain access to New York classrooms
through sponsored television); Whittle, Commercials, Plus Education, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1989, at
A25, col. 1.
8. See Nader & Riley, Oh, Say Can You See: A Broadcast Network for the Audience, 5 J.L. &
POL. 1, 53 n.274 (1988) (noting figures for 1987 advertising); see also Gerard, Advertisers Rush Back
to the Networks, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1989, at 29, col. 3 (national ed.) (noting $4 billion annual
advertising expenditures for prime-time hours alone).
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to preserve some realm of vital sociopolitical discourse, which either may
be segregated from entertainment media or reconciled with them. Fi-
nally, Part IV demonstrates how each of these responses fails to appreci-
ate the paradox of the first amendment in an age of paratroopers.
To avoid false expectations and to further the worthy mission of
first-amendment debate in this area,9 we close this Article on something
of an unresolved note. Having revealed the paradoxical nature of our
contemporary first-amendment situation, and having identified and criti-
cized the major responses to that predicament, we leave to others (would-
be paratroopers) and to a future essay10 any further struggle with the
paradox.
I. The "New" Pleasure Principle: Revisiting Brave New World
The high purpose of the first amendment's free speech and press
guarantees is characteristically, although not exclusively, associated with
protecting dissenters from government oppression. Contests between the
activist or critic and the established order are the stuff of which the first
amendment is made. Names such as John Peter Zenger,11 Jacob
Abrams,12 Irving Feiner,13 and Paul Robert Cohen 14 resonate with the
Madisonian principle of free expression. First-amendment theories such
as the traditional "marketplace of ideas," 15 the modem "antifoundation-
alist marketplace of ideas,"' 6 the "checking" function, 17 the "self-govern-
9. See Appendix A.
10. In another essay in progress, The Death of Discourse, we grapple with several of the deeper
points latent in this article. Importantly, here we consider the influences of an amusement-oriented
media culture on the sociopolitical values of the first amendment, and not on its rationality principle.
We realize that a fundamental relationship exists between the political and rationality values. On
this occasion, however, we attempt to isolate the entertainment problem from the antirationality
problem in order to enhance clarity.
11. See Rex v. Zenger, 17 St. Trials, 675, 723 (N.Y. Province 1735) (affirming a jury finding
that acquitted John Peter Zenger when the jury was to decide only whether the libelous words were
printed); L. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 119-43 (1985) (relating the story of John Peter
Zenger).
12. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 622-24 (1919) (rejecting a first-amendment
challenge to a conspiracy conviction for opposing the United States "capitalist invasion of Russia");
R. POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS 197-242 (1987) (analyzing the Supreme Court's rejection of first-
amendment challenge to espionage conviction in Abrams).
13. See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321-22 (1951) (rejecting a first-amendment chal-
lenge to a conviction for incitement of breach of the peace by a street corner protestor).
14. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1971) (upholding a draft protestor's first-
amendment claim).
15. See, e.g., Greenwalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 130-41 (1989)
(analyzing the premises of classical marketplace theory); Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legiti-
mizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 nn.1-2 (arguing, through numerous examples, that jurists and
scholars often use the marketplace-of-ideas image to legitimize first amendment freedoms).
16. An excellent attack on the premises underlying the traditional marketplace-of-ideas theory
and a reconstruction of the marketplace metaphor in light of "antifoundational" criticism is pro-
vided in Scanlan, Aliens in the Marketplace of Ideas: The Government, the Academy, and the McCar-
1090
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ance"' 8 and "autonomy and self-realization" rationales, 19 and "romantic
eclecticism" 20 enshrine, in essential part, the spirit of civic pride in socio-
political engagement and civic disdain for governmental suppression of
political viewpoints. In essence, all first-amendment cases and theories
establish the necessity of preserving an environment in which robust so-
ciopolitical discourse and action may be tested. Without this environ-
ment for experimentation, the first amendment, as we know it, cannot
survive.
This lofty experiment is hailed as the antithesis of the Orwellian re-
gime,21 in which the hand of an omnipresent government squelches dis-
sent, bans books, denies information, and conceals truth. Triumphantly,
America has survived 1984, and is less fearful of Orwell's dark determin-
ism. But our Orwellian perspective has prevented us from focusing on an
equally menacing, and more realistic, threat-the evil first identified in
Aldous Huxley's antiutopian Brave New World 22 and later developed in
his Brave New World Revisited.23 As Huxley himself contended 24 and as
Professor Neil Postman echoed,25 it is this threat that looms largest to-
ran-WalterAct, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 1481, 1523-30, 1539-44 (1988). See also Post, The Constitutional
Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 603, 632-33 (1990) (analyzing the first amendment's commitment to
neutrality with respect to the normative values of specific communities-a "marketplace of commu-
nity" rationale, as it were).
17. See, e.g., Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. REs.
J. 521, 527-42 (arguing that the power of public opinion exposes and deters abuses of power by
public officials).
18. See, eg., A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF
THE PEOPLE 9-28 (1960) (asserting the hierarchy of first-amendment speech values justifying dual-
level protections); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 26
(1971) (arguing that the first amendment protects only "explicitly and predominantly political"
speech).
19. See, e.g., C. BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47-69 (1989) (advocat-
ing the protection of speech not because free speech is an instrumental means to a collective good but
because of the normative value of the speech conduct to the individual); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM
OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970) (arguing that free speech promotes the realization of human
character and potentialities); M. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 20-30
(1984) (arguing that free speech enables the formation of life-affecting decisions); Scanlan, A Theory
of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 213-15 (1972) (defending the principle that
certain ills must be accepted in order to maintain freedom of expression).
Our characterization of this rationale assumes that, at an important level, these theorists would
distinguish between self-realization and self-gratification. In other words, the individual who is self-
realized is significantly more than a glutton for pleasure and amusement.
20. See, e.g., S. SHIFFRIN, supra note 3.
21. See G. ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
22. A. HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1946).
23. A. HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD REVISITED (1958).
24. See 2 S. BEDFORD, ALDOUS HUXLEY: A BIOGRAPHY 490-91 (1973) (Huxley, in a letter to
George Orwell, maintained: "I feel that the nightmare of Nineteen Eighty-Four is destined to modu-
late into the nightmare of a world having more resemblance to that which I imagined in Brave New
World.").
25. See N. POSTMAN, AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH at vii (1985) [hereinafter N. POST-
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day. We maintain that the Huxleyan evil particularly endangers our his-
toric and idealistic commitment to freedom of expression.
The Huxleyan nightmare is one in which government has no need to
censor dissent, no cause to hide truth, and no ground to ban serious dis-
cussion. It is a world of passivity, pleasure, and trivialization, a world
whose citizenry euphorically digests narcotic "soma tablets."'26 The
brave new world offers a surfeit of entertainment, "non-stop distractions
of the most fascinating nature (the feelies, orgy-porgy, centrifugal bum-
ble-puppy)" 27 that ensure a state of perpetual amusement and happiness.
The governing maxim is: "Everybody's happy now."
'28
The purpose of all this "happiness" is to numb. The "non-stop dis-
tractions ... are deliberately used as instruments of policy, for the pur-
pose of preventing people from paying too much attention to the realities
of the social and political situation. '29 The problem with all this "happi-
ness" is the servitude that it spawns, and the tyranny that a love of servi-
tude makes possible. The rulers of Huxley's antiutopia have learned that
soma tablets more effectively suppress the critical spirit that the iron fist
of Orwell's world oppresses.
30
In the brave new world, the antiquated first amendment is eclipsed.
Its fear of the tyranny of terror-demonstrated, for example, by the
Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, the Espionage Acts of 1917 and 1918,
and the McCarthy era-is overshadowed by a tyranny of pleasure. The
Orwellian constraints on physical liberty and ideological freedom consti-
tuted "hands-on" tyranny, but the Huxleyan conception is a "hands-off"
governmental tyranny. Huxley understood tyranny as the product of
MAN, AMUSING]; N. POSTMAN, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTIONS 51, 168, 174 (1988) [hereinafter N.
POSTMAN, CONSCIENTIOUS]. Professor Postman's provocative writings on public discourse do not
address the first-amendment issues discussed in this article. Moreover, and as we point out later, the
substance of Huxley's writings is more relevant to our first-amendment inquiry than Professor Post-
man has need to draw upon for his particular project. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
26. A. HUXLEY, supra note 22, at 63-65, 71-72, 88-89; A. HUXLEY, supra note 23, at 85. In
Huxley's works, soma was a mild drug dispensed by the government to sedate and gratify the popu-
lace. According to Huxley, "the soma habit was not a private vice; it was a political institution, it
was the very essence of the Life, Liberty and Pursuit of Happiness guaranteed by the Bill of Rights."
Id. at 85.
27. A. HUXLEY, supra note 23, at 45.
28. A. HUXLEY, supra note 22, at 88, 110.
29. A. HUXLEY, supra note 23, at 45.
30. See id. at 5. Huxley perceptively contrasts his world with Orwell's.
[C]ontrol through the punishment of undesirable behavior is less effective, in the long run,
than control through the reinforcement of desirable behavior by rewards, and... govern-
ment through terror works on the whole less well than government through the non-vio-
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those "great impersonal forces now menacing freedom, 31 the "motiva-
tion analyst[s]" 32 who held out the soma tablets.
In an insightful passage particularly applicable to the first amend-
ment, Huxley questioned the outdated eighteenth-century constitutional
ideal:
[T]he early advocates of... a free press envisaged only two pos-
sibilities: the propaganda might be true, or it might be false. They
did not foresee what in fact has happened, above all in our Western
capitalist democracies-the development of a vast mass communi-
cations industry, concerned in the main with neither the true nor
the false, but with the unreal, the more or less totally irrelevant. In
a word, they failed to take into account man's almost infinite appe-
tite for distractions.
33
Huxley's depiction of a tyranny of pleasure accurately forecasts the con-
temporary American culture of commercial television. Huxley realized
the connection between commercial television and his antiutopia: "That
so many of the well-fed young television-watchers in the world's most
powerful democracy should be so completely indifferent to the idea of
self-government, so blankly uninterested in freedom of thought and the
right to dissent, is distressing, but not too surprising.
'34
America's primary information medium is also its most popular
source of entertainment, its favorite plaything. Metaphorically, televi-
sion is the soma tablet of modern society.
II. The Soma Medium: Reflections on Its Attributes and
Commercial Use
Because television is one of the primary media through which we
conceptualize reality, its messages profoundly influence the nature of
public awareness and discussion of important issues. As Professor Post-
man observed: "[T]here is no subject of public interest-politics, news,
education, religion, science, sports-that does not find its way to televi-
sion. ' ' 35 Furthermore, television "has made entertainment itself the nat-
ural format for the representation of all experience .... To say it still
another way: Entertainment is the supraideology of all discourse on tele-
vision."'3 6 The medium's entertainment biases derive primarily from two
31. Id. at 136-37.
32. Id. at 64.
33. Id. at 44.
34. Id. at 145.
35. N. POSTMAN, AMUSING, supra note 25, at 78.
36. Id. at 87; accord Hendrix, Is the Sky Really Falling?, L.A. Times, Sept. 25, 1989, § 5, at 1,
col. 2 (stating that television "has become the command center of our culture"); see also I. MITROFF
& W. BENNIS, THE UNREALITY INDUSTRY 176-86 (1989) (arguing that entertainment has blurred
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combined forces: first, the attributes of television's technology;37 and
second, the commercialization of television as a profit-oriented enter-
prise. These two forces create a communicative environment that favors
trivial and entertaining programming. Both television's technological
nature and commercial use disfavor sustained concentration, as attention
is grabbed by a dynamic, fast-moving, and ever-changing series of
images.3 Television, as we have come to know it,39 loses a key ingredi-
ent of its mass appeal when divorced from the visually 4° dramatic plea-
sure programs-for example, rock videos, sports events, "action" news.
Where sustained concentration is the concern, neither Thomas Paine's
Common Sense4l nor The Federalist Papers42 would play well on net-
work television. The same holds true, in television vernacular, for "talk-
ing heads" programs.
43
reality and unreality and has thereby debased public discourse); N. POSTMAN, CONSCIENTIOUS,
supra note 25, at 168 (arguing that Americans look to television to define their culture even though
television trivializes everything it transmits).
37. Various communications theorists have investigated the operation nd effect of different
modes of communication, including the electronic media. Of course, any complete study of the
subject would require the presentation and analysis of the views of individuals such as James Carey,
Florian Coulmas, Daniel Czitrom, Elizabeth Eisenstein, Jacques Ellul, Franco Ferrarotti, Todd Git-
lin, Eric Havelock, Hal Himmelstein, Ivan Illich, Harold Innis, Robert Logan, Jerry Mander, Mar-
shall McLuhan, Joshua Meyrowitz, Mark Miller, Walter Ong, Barry Sanders, Tony Schwartz, and
Raymond Williams. Also worthy of consideration is the scholarship of cultural theorists concerned
with the social and economic effects of mass technological culture, including among many others the
critical works of C. Wright Mills, Lewis Mumford, and Stuart and Elizabeth Ewen. Although our
Article relies on certain insights from this rich body of literature, a more extended discussion of the
relevance of these works to law is reserved for our forthcoming essay, The Death of Discourse.
38. Professor Postman explains that "[the average length of a shot on network television is
only 3.5 seconds, so that the eye never rests, always has something to see." N. POSTMAN, AMUSING,
supra note 25, at 86. Postman also remarks that "[t]he learning modules of the TV curriculum are
extremely short and compact-commercials run anywhere from ten to sixty seconds; what are
called 'programs' run from thirty to sixty minutes but are always sequenced in eight- to ten-minute
modules." N. POSTMAN, TEACHING AS A CONSERVING ACTIVITY 60-61 (1979); see also Goldberg,
TV- Up-Links and Hi-Jinks at the Summit, Wall St. J., Dec. 4, 1989, at A12, col. 1 (noting the
extravaganza created on Malta by the media covering the summit); Goodman, For TV Networks at
Malta, Big Stars, Great Scenery, but 'Anchors Adrift," N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1989, at A9, col. 1
("Television has taught us that there is a scant relationship between the significance of an event and
the power of the picture .... [W]hether it is a Presidential election or a superpower summit, the
substance is not readily captured by the camera.").
39. But may we come to know it in the future in new, multidimensional and more pervasive
ways-ways that merge modes of communication and further accentuate their entertainment func-
tion. See, e.g., Schlender, Couch Potatoes! Now It's Smart TV, FORTUNE, Nov. 20, 1989, at 111, 111
(explaining "Frox's home entertainment system" which combines television, VCR, stereo, computer,
phone, and fax capacities); Markoff, Personal Computers May Combine Brain with Beauty of TV,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1989, at 1, col. 6 (relating various methods by which television and computers
may interact).
40. For a discussion of the audio influence of television, see R. ALTMAN, Television/Sound, in
STUDIES IN ENTERTAINMENT 39, 44-46 (1986); Foltz, Sound Becomes the New Frontier for TVAds,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1990, at CIO, col. 3.
41. T. PAINE, COMMON SENSE (I. Kramnick ed. 1776).
42. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 1-84.
43. In the last three decades, the only "talking heads" program to achieve a top twenty-five
1094
The First Amendment in an Age of Paratroopers
A. The Attributes of Television's Technology
The imagistic character of television produces a flow of information
that is largely framed, context-free, and context-compressed. 4 A mas-
terful exploitation of these properties occurred in the 1988 presidential
campaign. With notable expertise, political media strategists situated
then-presidential candidate George Bush in front of a colorful New
Jersey flag factory.45 This framed bit of television "reality" instantane-
ously communicated patriotism and leadership without the heavy bag-
gage of commentary on the issues of the day. 4 6 In addition, television
conveys information in a discontinuous and nonsequential manner.47
For example, television programming catalogues a variety of disassoci-
ated subjects, 48 placing the national news next to a game show, and situ-
ranking in network television ratings was 60 Minutes. See T. BROOKS & E. MARSH, THE COMPLETE
DIRECTORY TO PRIME TIME NETWORK TV SHOWS: 1946-PRESENT 966-75 (4th ed. 1988).
Although one may quibble, it is questionable whether the "action-packed" 60 Minutes can be char-
acterized as a "talking heads" program. Bill Moyers' Public Broadcasting Service series, A World of
Ideas, is a finer example of "talking heads" programming, but it is viewed on a much smaller scale.
See B. MOYERS, A WORLD OF IDEAS (1989) (edited versions of 41 interviews taken by Moyers of
experts in a variety of fields about the ideas shaping our future).
44. See T. GITLIN, THE WHOLE WORLD IS WATCHING 5-13 (1980) ("What makes the world
beyond direct experience look natural is a media frame.... Media frames are persistent patterns of
cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-
handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual."). Admittedly, other forms of com-
munication, such as print, "frame" reality. See, eg., M. MCLUHAN, THE GUTENBERG GALAXY:
THE MAKING OF TYPOGRAPHIC MAN 229-30 (1962) (positing the logic of printing as a centralized
and homogenizing force which regulates language, the paint brush of reality); see also Collins, Writ-
ing on Writing (forthcoming essay) (copy on file with Texas Law Review) (arguing that any medium
is too confining to adequately express the ideas it reflects. Even McLuhan, the critic of "the medium
is the message" concept, was limited to expressing his ideas through the medium of print). But
television "frames" differ in essential ways: they are more imagistically dramatic; they can instanta-
neously capture more unprocessed information; and they can divorce information from its natural
and larger context in a more visually sensational manner.
45. See Farrell, The Electronic Election: Campaign By Image, Boston Globe, Nov. 13, 1988,
§ B (Special Report), at 6-7.
46. Similarly, we are told by one of "The Great Communiiator's" top aides that President
Ronald Reagan sallied forth to address the important subject of housing construction "wearing a
hard hat and standing in front of homes under construction.... Naturally, the story played big on
the evening news." Deaver, Sound-Bite Campaigning: TV Made Us Do It, Wash. Post, Oct. 30,
1988, at C7, col. 2.
National Republican Party Chairman and manager of the 1988 Bush presidential campaign,
Lee Atwater, sums up the function of the modern political campaign consultant as "'spend[ing] an
hour and a half [every morning] figuring out what you're going to do to get on the news that night-
to get in the news hole. What stunt you can pull that will give you 14 seconds of news hole.'"
Oreskes, America's Politics Loses Way as Its Vision Changes World, N.Y. Times, March 18, 1990, at
A16, col. 4.
47. See, e.g., J. MEYROWITZ, supra note 6, at 79 ("The logical linking of pieces of information
into large, complex, and connected treatises and theories is a feature of writing and print.... [Televi-
sion, by contrast,] favors discrete clumps of information rather than long connected arguments and
analyses." (footnote omitted)).
48. Of course, the disassociation of ideas is not a property unique to electronic media communi-
cation. Something of the same phenomenon surfaces in oral communication. Typographic commu-
nication, by contrast, places a premium on the analytically linear. Whatever the degree of
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ating an endless number of disjointed scenes within a single rock video.
These attributes of television's technology maximize its potential as an
entertainment medium.
All of this, of course, serves to erode a continuous and critical social
perspective. Picture stories49 that capitalize on aesthetics and emotion
do not really promote synthesis, analysis, or criticism; they likewise do
little to enhance any desire to take a longer and harder second look at
our culture and its directions. Although a "live news story" about a lone
Montana gunman squaring off with a SWAT team may be "hot" national
news, it trades an informed treatment of the problems of crime and jus-
tice in our society for "action" pictures. "Television teaches you to know
through what you see and feel. Its epistemology begins and largely ends
in the viscera." 50 The aesthetic and emotional experience is unquestiona-
bly television's standard fare and modus operandi.51 In short, as veteran
reporter Daniel Schorr has put it: "Television allows people to experi-
ence more and understand less. It appeals more to the senses than to the
intellect." '5
2
Out of this picture-centered environment emerges the prototype of
the public leader: Ronald Reagan. The former President and "former
Hollywood movie actor, rarely [spoke] accurately and never precisely,
[yet he was] known as the Great Communicator; his telegenic charm [ap-
peared] to be his major asset."' 53 Professor James Barber, a leading presi-
dential scholar, captured the essence of the Reagan television image:
disassociation in oral communication, television has institutionalized the phenomenon and made it a
significant aspect of mass communicatiori. As we emphasize repeatedly in this text, commercial
television does not so much create a mindset hostile to traditional first-amendment values; rather,
commercial television greatly compounds the problems associated with the trivialization of discourse.
Cf. Gitlin, Blips, Bites & Savvy Talk, DISSENT, Winter 1990, at 18, 25-26.
49. See N. POSTMAN, supra note 38, at 55-56.
50. Id. at 58-59.
51. See N. POSTMAN, CONSCIENTIOUS, supra note 25, at 76-77. Postman notes:
Because time is so precious on television, because the nature of the medium favors dynamic
visual images, and because the pressures of a commercial structure require the news to hold
its audience above all else, there is rarely any attempt to explain issues in depth or place
events in their proper context.
Id.
52. Yaukey, Newsman Schorr Blasts Politics Warped by TV, Ithaca J., Nov. 15, 1988, at 3A,
col. 1 (quoting from a lecture delivered at Cornell University (Nov. 14, 1988)).
53. N. POSTMAN, CONSCIENTIOUS, supra note 25, at 169. Apparently, the Reagan campaign
model has been adopted abroad. See, e.g., Brooke, TV Making Obscure Brazilian the Candidate to
Beat at 39, N.Y. Times, July 31, 1989, at Al, col. 5. Speaking of the television appeal of presidential
candidate Fernando Collor de Mello, a Brazilian editorial writer observed: "He does not have a
program-he has an image. He does not have a party-he has a vehicle for his personality cult. He
does not say anything-only what people imagine that he is saying." Id. at A6, cols. 2-3. Mr. Collor
de Mello's strongest opponent was a popular television talent show host, Silvio Santos, who leapt
into the political fray 15 days before the election. See Margolis, TV Host Upstages Brazil's Politicos,
Wash. Post, Nov. 4, 1989, at A17, col. 1.
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"He personifies his rhetoric, speaks with filmic grammar, pretends spon-
taneity, rolls through narrative and translates every blunder and tragedy
into an upbeat lesson."' 54 Prophetically, in 1958, the British-born Huxley
anticipated the Reagan political persona and its vital role in the brave
new world:
In one way or another, as vigorous he-man or kindly father,
the candidate must be glamorous. He must also be an entertainer
who never bores his audience. Inured to television .... that audi-
ence is accustomed to being distracted and does not like to be
asked to concentrate or make a prolonged intellectual effort. All
speeches by the entertainer candidate must therefore be short and
snappy. The great issues of the day must be dealt with in five min-
utes at the most-and preferably.., in sixty seconds flat.
55
B. The Commercialization of Television
Obviously, amusement is not the unique product of contemporary
television technology. Entertainment existed before television and ex-
pressed itself in oral and print cultures, as the jester's antics and tabloids'
sensationalism so patently evidence. But today, television's phenomenal
appeal has placed a markedly new premium on the pursuit of plea-
sure56-recall that people spend as much time with their television sets as
they do at their jobs. In addition to the technological attributes of televi-
sion, the commercial use to which it is put significantly determines its
entertainment direction.5 7 The commerciality of television thus plays a
critical role in determining the directions of its programming. A direct
correlation exists between the popularity of a program and the genera-
tion of commercial advertising revenues. Popularity, of course, is gener-
ally an appeal to mass appetites-typically a minimum of a thirty percent
share of all viewers at a given time.5 8 The desire for popularity, and in
turn, profits, gives rise to television's "predictable entrepreneurial prob-
lem": "How do [producers and advertisers] get maximum audience for
maximum return?" 59 Generally, in attempting to maximize profits, com-
54. Barber, And Now, Mr. Lincoln, You Have 15 Seconds, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1988, § 7 (Book
Review), at 36. For post-Reagan advice to national public leaders on the techniques of "com[ing]
across well on television," see Marchand, Designing a Video Mask of Many Faces, N.Y. Times, Aug.
13, 1989, at H31, col. I (offering media advice to Vice-President Dan Quayle).
55. A. HUXLEY, supra note 23, at 71.
56. See, e.g., Goldberg, Did the Medium Become the Message?, Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1990, at A9,
col. 1 (arguing that television's entertainment format is the most significant factor in shaping the
American world view).
57. Television has even changed our perception of pleasure itself, allowing the aestheticized
surface-the abstract image-to dominate. Television has thus replaced pleasure with the image of
pleasure.
58. See Nader & Riley, supra note 8, at 54.
59. T. GITLIN, supra note 2, at 328-29.
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mercial television networks reach for the lowest common denominator in
discourse. 60 With profit-maximization as the governing norm, television
distorts traditional first-amendment values by "associating the lowest
passions with the highest ideals. ' 61 In this environment, it is not surpris-
ing that, when the CBS flagship television station in New York had to
choose between a game show, Win, Lose or Draw, and Dan Rather's eve-
ning news for the desirable seven p.m. time slot, the game show won. 62
By necessity, commercial television favors noncontroversial and un-
complicated programming.63 From an advertiser's standpoint, serious
public affairs programming may prove so volatile or complex as to dis-
courage commercial support. A mass medium heavily dependent on
such support will inevitably program with a bias to avoiding viewer con-
troversy or perplexity. 64 With broad-based popularity as its key stan-
60. See, e.g., F. GRAHAM, HAPPY TALK: CONFESSIONS OF A TV NEWSMAN 232 (1990) (not-
ing that the tendency of CBS network news producers was to assume "that the average television
viewer was rather dense and that the way to reach the largest number was to aim low and talk
down").
61. A. HUXLEY, supra note 23, at 41 (referring to propaganda).
62. See Boyer, The Shift of Rather, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1988, at 50, col. 6. The story
continued:
The move is intended to improve the ratings and, as a result, the advertising revenues
for Channel 2 in the highly competitive 7 to 8 P.M. time period, called "prime-time access"
in the television industry because it comes just before prime time, when viewership is high.
Many network-affiliated stations around the country have long since moved their net-
work newscasts into earlier time slots. The aim is twofold: not only can these stations
often get higher ratings with a game show than with network news, but they can also, by
keeping the entire "access" hour to themselves, retain all of the revenues earned in that
period.
Id.; see also Boyer, When News Must Pay Its Way, Expect Trivia, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1989, at A19,
col. 2 (warning that "journalists are becoming entertainers").
As a former news cameraman has observed: "Why pretend television news is anything but
entertainment?... Television is money-driven and viewer-numbers critical, and television news is
the circus of bread and circuses." Sturken, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1989, § 4, at
22, col. 3.
63. Today's commercial television producers and advertisers are the modern-day equivalent of
the ancient sophists who, in Plato's Republic, mastered the art of pleasing the "great strong beast."
PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 172-73 (A. Bloom trans. 1968). This point is entirely in keeping
with the Huxleyan message.
64. For a superb illustration of this point, consider the difficulties encountered by electronic
broadcasters in airing programs pertaining to the abortion issue. See, eg., Gay, 'Roe vs. Wade'Sells
Out, but Did the Advertisers Sell Out to Boycott Threat?, Variety, May 17, 1989, at 1, col. 3 (noting a
substantial loss of advertising revenue after drastic rate reductions by NBC, even though the pro-
gram was presented in a balanced and noncontroversial manner); Lipman, Barbara Walters Radio
Special on Abortion Shunned by Sponsors, Wall St. J., June 16, 1989, at BI, col. 5 (observing that the
network was unable to "sign up a single advertiser" because of the program's subject). Many of the
same problems confront public television. See, e.g., Goodman, Public TVJuggles a Hot Potato, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 3, 1989, § 2, at 1, col. 2 ("How can [public television] serve as a forum for all manner of
opinions, including those that are bound to irritate many viewers, yet retain its financial support?").
Indeed, corporations and advertisers employ television screening agencies to monitor the content of
network shows and to ensure that advertising dollars dictate standards for controversial program-
ming. See Carter, Screeners Help Advertisers Avoid Prime-Time Trouble, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1990,
at Cl, col. 1.
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dard, and the avoidance of controversy as its watch phrase, commercial
television inhibits the important first-amendment value of diversity of
subject and opinion.65 Indeed, the touted promise of cable television to
diversify content may well not be realized. In all likelihood, the econom-
ics of the commercial broadcast medium will foreclose any other result.
As commercial networks increase their holdings in the cable industry,66
the entrepreneurial chase for advertising revenues 67 and maximum
achievable market shares68 indicates that more and more cable program-
ming will mirror network entertainment shows. 69
Twenty-three billion dollars of annual commercial television adver-
65. Ralph Nader and Claire Riley have observed that
[d]emographic appeal is narrowed to exclude the elderly, [very] young, ethnic groups and
the underclass, and programs reflect this exclusion. Certain program formats are even
diminished or eliminated. There are, for example, no fine arts programs on commercial
television. Program-length documentaries have been drastically cut back, replaced by
short subject highlights on the national news.
Nader & Riley, supra note 8, at 54 (footnotes omitted). Even documentaries have fallen victim to
commercial television's penchant for dramatic mass appeal. See, e.g., O'Connor, Blurring the Line
Between Fact and Fiction, N.Y. Times, May 21, 1989, at H27, col. 1 (noting the rise in based-on-fact
network movies that tend to use a reality label to perpetuate comfortable myths).
For thoughtful discussions of the transformation of the "public" into a commercial "mass," see
W. LEISS, S. KLINE & S. JHALLY, SOCIAL COMMUNICATION IN ADVERTISING 307 (1986) ("With
media output controlled by the audience logic of advertising, there is no real marketplace for ideas,
that is, no public forum where widely different types of social actors can buy and sell information,
opinion, and images that express their interests."); C. MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 298-324 (1956).
66. See, e.g., I. DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 49-52 (1983) (noting that the
recent lifting of FCC restrictions on network ownership of cable systems has opened the door for
large publishing and broadcasting organizations to further extend their cross-ownership of media
concerns); T. GITLIN, supra note 2, at 331-32 (noting that "the networks are diversifying into pay
cable and other new technologies so that, like the giant oil companies, they may end up controlling a
considerable share of their competition"); see also Bagdikian, The Lords of the Global Village, THE
NATION, June 12, 1989, at 805, 807-10 (describing the "big five" media corporations that control the
world's mass media); Nader & Riley, supra note 8, at 61 (noting that the networks still command a
majority share of the viewing audience and that the advent of cable has not decreased the dominance
of the networks because local cable systems merely retransmit television broadcasts without altering
'their form or content).
67. The Cable Television Advertising Bureau established that advertisers spent $2 billion on
commercial cable services in 1989, an increase of 30% over the total spent on cable commercials in
1988. In planning their purchases of commercial time-slots for new television seasons, major adver-
tising agencies now view cable services as they do network television. Reportedly, advertisers "are
finding that in terms of programming cable is more like regular television, and that makes them
comfortable.... Indeed, advertisers spending on cable [in 1989] mirrored exactly what happened in
network television." Fabrikant, Cable TVIs No Longer a Stepchild, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1990, at
D17, col. 1.
68. See, e.g., T. GITLIN, supra note 2, at 328 (noting that capital demands of the new networks
are identical to those of the old networks: maximum achievable market shares).
69. According to Ralph Nader and Claire Riley: "Although fifty-one percent of cable systems
have over thirty channels .... the majority of the programming does not differ substantially from
what is offered on network television. In fact, cable operators spend most of their programming
dollars to acquire movies." Nader & Riley, supra note 8, at 62 (footnotes omitted). Similarly, Pro-
fessor Todd Gitlin observes:
[Cable operators] have quickly learned that the surest way to carve out a big national
market is to take some existing segment of the network schedule and to stretch it through-
out a longer broadcast day. Thus sports, old movies, news, and syndicated series are the
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tising has a monumental pressure and product effect: money influences
programming while commercial advertising strives to create a market for
products. Commercials exploit the very entertainment format that con-
stitutes today's television programming. Indeed, media ads are the para-
gon of the commercial television aesthetic, the ultimate in transmission
of fantasy via the pleasure medium. Professor Postman captures the es-
sence of commercial advertising when he states:
[C]ommercials stress the values of youth, ... consumption, the
immediate gratification of desires, the love of the new, a contempt
for what is old. Television screens saturated with commercials
promote the Utopian and childish idea that all problems have fast,
simple, and technological solutions. You must banish from your
mind the naive but commonplace notion that commercials are
about products. . . . They are about values and myths and
fantasies. 70
The typical television viewer partakes of the culture of the commercial
71
in astonishing proportions: "[T]he average American will have seen ap-
proximately 1 million television commercials, at the rate of a thousand
per week, by the age of twenty. By the age of sixty-five, the average
American will have seen more than 2 million television commercials."
7 2
It is an incredible comment on the seductive power of television advertis-
ing over consumers that the more successful commercials have remained
on the air for over a quarter-century.
73
The aesthetics of commercial television have influence far beyond
the realm of advertising. As politicians master the strategies of advertis-
ing, the line between important political discourse and pure entertain-
ment becomes increasingly blurred. Advertising agency professionals
serve as "media consultants" to the candidates and orchestrate cam-
paigns as if they were prime-time commercials. Forklifts, flag factories,
tanks, harbor rides, and convict turnstiles were only a few of the back-
drops for the staged 1988 presidential media events. 74 The commercial
media exploited the deceptive practices of the past-the 1988 presidential
staples of the new cable networks and are likely to remain so. What they offer is not so
much different as more of the same.
T. GITLIN, supra note 2, at 328. These arguments hold equally true for "direct-broadcast" televi-
sion. For a description of this "direct-to-home satellite TV programming service," see Landro, Di-
rect-Broadcast TV May Be Getting off the Ground, Wall St. J., Feb. 21, 1990, at B1, col. 3.
70. N. POSTMAN, CONSCIENTIOUS, supra note 25, at 113.
71. The culture of the commercial undergoes a remarkable evolution, as the newly developed
"info-mercial"-a 30-minute to 3-hour commercial presented as a talk show-evidences. See Brush,
Heeeeere's The Commerciall, Wash. Post, Feb. 11, 1990, at Fl, col. 1.
72. N. POSTMAN, CONSCIENTIOUS, supra note 25, at 113.
73. See And Now a Word About Our Sponsors, PEOPLE WEEKLY, Summer 1989 Extra, at 120,
120-23 (noting longevity of Timex, Charmin, and Rice Krispies commercials).
74. See Farrell, supra note 45, at 7.
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backdrops were primed to "communicate" more than "babes in arms"
ever could. 7
5
True to the entertainment-commercial format, "sound-bite" dis-
course increasingly replaces reflective deliberations over complex socio-
political problems.76 As Ms. Kiku Adatto's analysis of more than 280
week-day network newscasts from 1968 to 1988 reveals:
The average "sound bite," or bloc of uninterrupted speech,
fell from 42.3 seconds in 1968 to only 9.8 seconds in 1988.
In 1968, almost half of all sound bites were 40 seconds or
more, compared with only one percent in 1988.
In 1968, [political] candidates spoke for a minute without in-
terruption in 21 percent of all newscasts. In 1988, this never
happened.
77
"Sound-bite" discourse was the fare of the last televised presidential
debates, which columnist George Will aptly described as "tossed salads
of brevity," serving only to "test skills unrelated to the real tasks of gov-
ernance.... [These] debates [were] primarily the regurgitation of mar-
ket-tested paragraphs. Reflexes, not thinking, [were] crucial." '78 Ronald
Reagan once remarked: "Politics is just like show business."' 79 One need
only witness the spectacle of United States Senators, governors, promi-
nent mayors, and presidential aspirants who make cameo appearances on
"Saturday Night Live" 80 to realize the truth of former-President Rea-
75. During the 1988 presidential and congressional campaigns, candidates and their political
consultants exploited commercial television's potential for deceptive political campaign practices by
giving a new level of visibility to negative advertising. "Attacks ads" are part of the "unceasing
quest for the image, the code word, the value, the picture that moves voters." See Toner, "Wars"
Wound Candidates and the Process, N.Y. Times, March 19, 1990, at Al, col. 2, A14, col. 3.
For an original look at the effect of the electronic media culture on poetry, see Barbiero, Poetry
in the Age of Hyperinformation, With Reflections on What, 15 CENTRAL PARK 144, 144-50 (1989).
76. According to Michael Sheehan, advisor to four democratic presidential aspirants in 1988:
"[Politicians] must understand that the [television] time frame is scrunched-[they] need to be able
to express a complex idea in about 15 seconds." The Remaking of the Candidate, CAMPAIGNS &
ELECTIONS, May-June 1988, at 27, 28 (interview with Michael Sheehan). Some suggest that the
trend in sound-bite discourse evident in the 1988 elections will continue. See, e.g., Perry, White
Middle Class May Still Tip Balance in Elections in the '90s: With Attention Spans Briefer than a TV
'Sound Bite' Don't Look for Substance, Wall St. J., May 15, 1989, at Al, col. 1 (predicting that the
battle between the Democrats and Republicans for political ascendancy in the immediate future
"will be nasty and negative, waged in the clutter of shorter and shorter 'sound-bites' on more and
more TV channels"); see also Confessions of a Sound Bite, Wash. Post, Oct. 22, 1989, at C5, col. 1
("As TV news increasingly has no use for information that is not scheduled to fit into a package, it
loses interest in anyone who it has determined in advance will not be a sound bite.").
77. Addato, TV Tidbits Starve Democracy, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1989, at D23, col. 1; see also
Buresh, Stop the World! I Want to Think!, L.A. Times, Dec. 30, 1989, at B6, col. 3 ("The tendency
in commercial television is to speed up .... Television can give us so much, except the time to
think.").
78. Will, The Uselessness of Debates, Wash. Post, Sept. 11, 1988, at C7, cols. 1, 4.
79. E. DREW, PORTRAIT OF AN ELECTION: THE 1980 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 263 (1981).
80. See Postman & Ashcroft, TVBrings Distortions to Politics, Atlanta Const., Jan. 24, 1988, at
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gan's observation. Reflecting on this truth, broadcast journalist Bill
Moyers forecasts a gloomy future for the American polity:
Running campaigns in a nation on the pleasure principle is wreck-
ing the polity of America, destroying our ability as a cooperative
society to face reality and solve our problems.... Behind the
charm and smiles, behind the one-liners [and] the pretty pictures,
... the government rots, its costs soar, its failures mount .... But,
on the bridge of the ship of state, no one's on watch and below
deck no one can see the iceberg but everyone's feeling good.81
Not only politics, but other forms of important public discourse are
increasingly packaged as entertainment when touched by television. The
old Edward R. Murrow news model8 2 is yielding ever more to attractive
"anchors, '8 3 staged visuals, lulling music, compressed context,8 4 and
commercially-oriented "video news releases." s85 "'The presence of news
C5, col. I (noting the appearances of Paul Simon, Jesse Jackson, Bruce Babbitt, George McGovern
and Ed Koch). In addition, Michael Dukakis appeared on Cheers. See id.
81. The Public Mind: Leading Questions (PBS television broadcast, Nov. 15, 1989) (transcript
on file with Texas Law Review) (statement of Moyers); see also Hall, Bill Moyers Holds a Mirror up
to America, L.A. Times, Nov. 12, 1989 (magazine supplement), at 4, col. 1 (statement of Moyers).
82. See IN SEARCH OF LIGHT: THE BROADCASTS OF EDWARD R. MURROW 1938-1961, at 9-
13 (E. Bliss ed. 1967) (Murrow covered world events for CBS radio and television, starting with an
eyewitness report on Hitler's seizure of Austria and ending with coverage of John F. Kennedy's
inauguration).
83. Broadcast journalist Bill Moyers boldly characterizes the phenomenon of anchor "star
power": "'Tabloid TV shows are polluting journalistic standards by hiring celebrities as "report-
ers." What happens to the basic standards of journalism when they are abandoned for the "celeb-
rity" appeal of imposters?'" Hall, supra note 81, at 84, col. 4 (statement of Moyers); see also Zoglin,
Star Power, TIME, Aug. 7, 1989, at 46, 46-47, 49 (noting the negative influence of anchor stars on
news, stressing excessive salaries of anchor stars and monetary costs to news divisions, and criticiz-
ing the immense power wielded behind the scenes by such anchors and the effects of that power on
news broadcasting); Cohen, Drifting Anchors, Wash. Post, Feb. 16, 1990, at A23, col. 1 (explaining
that the anchor's geographic presence, not the news value, determines the content of news program-
ming); Goodman, New Cohost on "Today" Eases Her Way into the Job, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1990, at
C18, col. 5 ("Personality is the main commodity [for being a morning news show host]: a ready
smile to welcome visitors to another day; a go-down-smooth manner, to help the digestion of break-
fast; a talent for making prepared small talk seem off the cuff .. ").
84. Criticizing the USA Today program, television critic Tom Shales quips: "'Snippet' is actu-
ally too grand a term for what the syndicated program dishes out. There are sound-bites, light bites,
[and] news bites." Shales, 'USA Today, 'Nibbles And Bits, Wash. Post, Sept. 13, 1988, at Cl, col. 1.
"All journalism is condensation, but 'USA Today' takes this goal to a dizzying extreme. In pound-
ing its informational nuggets into mush, it challenges viewers to find some reason to watch-other
than to test their kinetic responsiveness." Id. at C8, col. 2.
85. Video news releases are "promotional materials that often mimic the techniques and con-
ventions of television news programs." Rothenberg, Promotional News Videos Gain Support, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 11, 1989, at D12, col. 3. As described by Professor Eugene Secunda of Baruch College,
a video news release
is an approximately 90 second electronic version of the PR profession's basic print tool, the
press release. It's designed to promote the interests of its sponsor more subtly than TV
commercials, which are required to clearly identify the advertiser. Its targets are the 700
local television station news shows currently produced in the nearly 300 U.S. media
centers.
E. Secunda, Video News Releases: The Hidden Persuaders Revisited? 1 (Oct. 8, 1989) (unpublished
paper delivered at Annual Media Ecology Conference in Saugherties, New York) (copy on file with
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in prime time, competing against entertainment shows, creates ... pres-
sures to make news stories more visually compelling,'" maintains Mr.
Ed Turner, the executive vice-president of Cable News Network.8 6 Even
the make-believe of simulated events87 and docu-dramas88 conform with
the entertainment standards of today's news world. TV critic Tom
Shales correctly observes: "More and more in television, stories that
should be treated in documentary fashion end up as TV movies, and sto-
ries that would make good TV movies end up as news productions. The
line between news and entertainment hasn't just been blurred; every-
thing's gone topsy-turvy."'8 9 In such a world, as sacrosanct a prospect as
Christ's second coming would be packaged for commercial television
with all its electronically graven images.90
The confessions of the titans of our television culture, offered in a
November 1988 broadcast exchange, help to validate the evidence ten-
dered above:
George Will (syndicated columnist): [comment to James Baker]
It's November and the election is still this way. Isn't there a dan-
ger now that you come to November 9th.... and you say that our
mandate is not to have furloughs, to pledge allegiance to the flag,
to stay out of the American Civil Liberties Union... then, how do
you govern on the basis of that?
James A. Baker, III (Bush campaign chairman): Well ... I really
respectfully disagree with you because the fact of the matter is that
Texas Law Review); see also Lipman, "News" Videos That Pitch Drugs Provoke Outcry for Regula-
tions, Wall St. J., Feb. 8, 1990, at B5, col. 1 (noting some 2000 to 2500 releases offered annually to
TV stations nationwide).
86. Carter, ABC News Divided on Simulated Events, N.Y. Times, July 27, 1989, at C20, cols. 4,
6 (quoting Ed Turner, executive vice-president of Cable News Network).
87. See id. at C20, col. 4 (discussing ABC News's use of simulated scene depicting Felix S.
Bloch, the subject of an espionage investigation, exchanging a briefcase with a Soviet diplomat); see
also Goldman, CBS News Stands by Re-Enactment as Used in Series, Wall St. J., Jan. 15, 1990, at B5,
col. 3 (stating that CBS will continue to use simulations although some adjustments will be made).
88. See Goodman, The Basic Crookedness of Docu-dramas, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1989, at C24,
col. 4 (docu-dramas turn "real life into entertainment"); Garment, "Final Days" for the First
Amendment, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1989, at A19, cols. 1, 4 ("If the courts diminish First Amendment
protection..., it will come in the area of the docudrama. Here, the preponderant product.., is so
far removed from any respectable definition of journalism that it will be difficult to invoke the First
Amendment with a straight face."); Goldman, TV Network News Is Making Re-Creation a Form of
Recreation, Wall St. J., Oct. 30, 1989, at 1, col. 1 (discussing "marriage of news and theatre");
O'Connor, supra note 65, at H27, cols. 3-4.
89. Shales, Chung's Glossy Magazine, Wash. Post, Sept. 25, 1989, at B1, col. 4. As Bill Moyers
powerfully puts it: "'When you mix fiction and news, you diminish the distinction between truth
and fiction, and you wear down the audience's own discriminating power to judge if that was so or
not so.'" Hall, supra note 81, at 84, col. 3 (statement of Moyers).
90. To examine the current state of public relations art, Harper's hired public relations consul-
tants to develop a media strategy for winning over American opinion at the Second Coming of Jesus
Christ. The resulting strategies included a staged appearance on "Saturday Night Live," a media
"sound-bite," a national tour, and a battery of one-minute television commercials announcing the
Second Coming. See He's Backfl, HARPER'S, Apr. 19, 1989, at 47, 47.
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we have to deal in thirty-second sound-bites. That's not our fault,
it's not your fault, it happens to be the fault of the fact that the
majority of the American people get their news that way.
... My point about the thirty-second sound-bite.. . is that this is
the way the American public get their news and therefore we in
campaigns have to take that into account... and plan accordingly.
David Brinkley (moderator): James A. Baker, Bush Chairman,
made an interesting point: It is difficult to get a program before
the American people because he seems to think that the thirty-
second commercial is the only vehicle available to them. I don't
think that's true. Is it true?
George Will: ... A study has been done and it is that ten years
ago, the average sound-bite... was forty-five seconds. In 1984 it
was down to fifteen-seconds. In the preliminary study this year,
[it] says it is down to nine-seconds. Why?
Sam Donaldson (ABC news correspondent): I'll tell you, yes, it's
true. I was doing some research for a book a couple of years ago
and I went back and looked at some of the pieces I did on ABC in
1971. And you're right, I ran sound-bites of George Meany [that]
went forty-three-seconds. Now it's something that's called, I call it
the Tom Pettit rule. Tom Pettit is a very able NBC correspondent,
but somehow he's gotten the sound-bite down to two seconds ....
There's something like . . . the dancing pig syndrome in which
every four or five or six seconds there must be another pig dancing
on the street.
Hodding Carter (PBS commentator; former spokesman for Carter
State Dept.): The devil made me do it is what I heard Mr. Baker
say about why they were doing it. We say in the television busi-
ness, "well, that's the way it is" ....
It's almost impossible to tell the difference today between a polit-
ical ad and an evening news spot about the campaign. They are
both impelled by the same ethos, the same standards, the same
techniques. Make it punchy, make it sharp, make it impactful.
And if it doesn't have anything to do with real issues, too bad, it's
good television. 91
Despite all that has been presented, it is important to appreciate sev-
91. This Week with David Brinkley (ABC television broadcast, Nov. 6, 1988) (emphasis added);
see also F. GRAHAM, supra note 60, at 219-20 (noting the transition from 1975s sixteen-second news
sound-bite to today's three-second news sound-bite, "too quick to be boring, or, frequently, intelligi-
ble").
Incredibly, CBS news correspondent Lesley Stahl admits with a mixture of embarrassment and
pride:
"As a reporter, I like to be able to wallpaper, as we say in television .... [That is, put]
pretty pictures up while I'm talking behind it. Pretty, interesting pictures, pictures with
movement. Pictures that will capture the audience eye. I shouldn't want that, because I
know that it's deceptive and the audience won't really hear what I'm saying. But I still like
it. I like my pieces to have energy."
The Public Mind: Illusions of News (PBS television broadcast, Nov. 22, 1989) (transcript on file with
Texas Law Review) (statement of Lesley Stahl).
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eral caveats inherent in our thesis. First, while television's biases alone
do not create the Huxleyan nightmare, they are nevertheless a vital com-
ponent. The human drive for pleasure, fueled by so many aspects of a
highly capitalistic and technological society, is greatly accelerated by the
amusement medium. Second, although studies linking commercial tele-
vision to cognitive and behavioral effects are indeterminate,92 more than
ample experiential evidence supports the obvious conclusion that a me-
dium that is all-pervasive has a significant effect on the structure of indi-
vidual and cultural discourse; that a society that dedicates more than a
quarter of every day to television is less likely to embrace the Madisonian
ideals of critical discourse and civic participation; and that billion-dollar
commercial efforts to institutionalize the pleasure principle have more
than a negligible effect on traditional first-amendment values. Third, the
ascendancy of the television culture may not affect everyone in the same
way. Nonetheless, just as its appeal is mass, so too its effects are mass,
and increasingly global. 93 Fourth, television is not without its social ben-
efits. 94 For example, it "can seem a blessing to old people, [and] to the
92. Having examined and synthesized over two hundred social science studies, University of
Massachusetts at Amherst psychology professors Daniel Anderson and Patricia Collins contend:
"There is, in fact, only a small relevant research literature [concerning the effects of television on
cognition and behavior] and that literature yields only a few firm conclusions." D. ANDERSON & P.
COLLINS, THE IMPACT ON CHILDREN'S EDUCATION: TELEVISION'S INFLUENCE ON COGNITIVE
DEVELOPMENT 8 (U.S. Dep't of Education, Office of Educational Research and Improvement
Working Paper No. 2, 1988). One such firm conclusion that the researchers did reach was that even
the lowest scientific estimate on viewing "represents large amounts of discretionary time spent with
TV such that the opportunity clearly exists for television to exert an influence on a large number of
children." Id. at 13. Among their final observations, Professors Anderson and Collins concluded:
"A true lack of influence is itself difficult to demonstrate, and there is not nearly enough research
done to safely conclude that there are no important cognitive effects of television viewing." Id. at 65.
For a more positive assertion of the causal relationship of television viewing to cognitive and behav-
ioral effects, see generally S. IYENGAR & D. KINDER, NEWS THAT MATTERS 112-33 (1987) (argu-
ing that television news influences the priority viewers place on issues and the criteria by which
viewers judge events).
Two points merit emphasis: First, a real possibility always exists that studies in this area will be
biased, particularly when the economic influence of special interest funding is substantial. See D.
ANDERSON & P. COLLINS, supra, at 72. Second, if tested by empirical evidence, the enhancement of
rationality by commercial mass communications may be equally difficult to establish. See id at 76.
93. With the growth of multinational media corporations and the potential for the commercial
media's invasion of a newly liberated Eastern Europe, among other places, world-wide programming
is likely to be patterned after the American entertainment model. See, e.g., Harmetz, Hollywood
Starts an Invasion ofEurope's Booming Market, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1990, at C19, col. 4 (quoting
Gary Lucchesi, president of production at Paramount Pictures, on the opening of Eastern Europe:
"The European market is expanding in leaps and bounds. When you combine the people in Eastern
Europe with the Common Market countries, you have close to a billion people who will be longing
for good [American] entertainment."); Ostry, The Risks in Going Global, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1989,
at H29, col. I (arguing that international broadcasters will destroy the values and cultures of individ-
ual nations).
94. Yet, Professor Postman interestingly maintains that "television is at its most trivial...
when its aspirations are high, when it presents itself as a carrier of important cultural conversations.
The irony here is that this is what intellectuals and critics are constantly urging television to do." N.
POSTMAN, AMUSING, supra note 25, at 16. Postman argues that, when high-minded programming is
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ill;''gs it may produce the likes of a Bill Moyers, 96 Ted Koppel, 97 or Wil-
liam F. Buckley, Jr.;98 and it may furnish information (albeit suitably
packaged) at electrifying speeds.99 But, the larger point remains that the
cultural costs of commercial television far exceed its benefits: 1°° a vac-
uum of serious public discourse has been filled by a television culture of
spectacle and a "'democracy of images.' "101
situated in an entertainment medium, "the seriousness, clarity and, above all, value of public dis-
course dangerously decline." Id. at 29; see also Anastaplo, Self-Government and the Mass Media, in
THE MASS MEDIA AND MODERN DEMOCRACY, 161, 198-218 (H. Clor ed. 1974) (arguing for the
removal of serious programming from television).
95. Anastaplo, supra note 94, at 204. But see Fantel, The Living Room Is Now the Stage, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 31, 1989, at H20, col. 5 (sociologists noting anticommunal effects of VCRs); Collins, TV
Subverts the First Amendment, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1987, at 31, col. I (noting how television
interferes with associational values).
96. See, eg., Bums, "Moyers: A Second Look"--More Than Meets the Eye, N.Y. Times, May
14, 1989, at H33, col. 1 (asserting that Moyers is "one of the most celebrated and at times controver-
sial providers of documentary films"); see also B. MOYERS, supra note 43, at ix (a collection of 41
interviews by Bill Moyers regarding "changing American values and how these values affect our
lives in an increasingly global culture"). Ironically, Moyers is acutely critical of his medium:
"The truth of the matter is, the networks are finished as enlightened forces in public
opinion. The mass media in this country are like the band on the Titanic. They're playing
for the passengers to dance while the ship hits the iceberg. A lot of people are going to get
rich before the collision, but they're finished as players ... 
Hall, supra note 81, at 84, col. 5 (statement of Moyers).
97. ABC's noted interviewer, when interviewed himself, commented on television's entertain-
ment function:
"Vanna [(Vanna White of the Wheel of Fortune show)] leaves an intellectual vacuum,
which can be filled by whatever the predisposition of the viewer happens to be," Koppel
told me. "The viewer can make her whatever he wants."...
Vannification is a fundamental principle in the understanding of political and media
success-and failure. Koppel believes the Vanna Factor now exists in all aspects of Ameri-
can life. "Mike Dukakis is using it, George Bush is using it," Koppel said. "And the more
successful you are in leaving a certain uncertainty in the mind of the voter .... You would
think that the voter would be frustrated by that, but on the contrary he has become accli-
mated to the notion that you just fill in the blank .... "
Blonsky, Ted Koppel's Edge, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1988, § 6 (Magazine), at 35.
For a worthwhile discussion among celebrated figures in electronic and print media about a
number of the issues discussed in this article, see The Other Side of the News: Entertainment News or
Entertainment? (New York's WNET broadcast, Apr. 12, 1989) (transcript on file with Texas Law
Review). Professor Fred Friendly moderated this public broadcasting event.
98. See generally W. BUCKLEY, ON THE FIRING LINE: THE PUBLIC LIFE OF OUR PUBLIC
FIGURES passim (1989) (presenting a collection of transcripts for two decades of Firing Line repre-
senting Buckley's interviews with various public figures).
99. Reportedly, the instantaneous televised transmission of political developments in Eastern
Europe played a significant role in spawning revolutionary fervor. Of course, these salutary effects
occurred in a commercial-free medium and in a social culture radically different than that of con-
temporary America. See, e.g., Tempest, Romania Had Its Rebirth in a Television Studio, L.A.
Times, Dec. 30, 1989, at A18, col. I (describing the influence of television on the Romanian Revolu-
tion); Rosenblum, Free Romania Television Fueled Nation's Revolution, L.A. Times, Dec. 27, 1989,
at F3, col. I (describing the National Salvation Committee's use of television to lead the Romanian
Revolution).
100. See N. POSTMAN, AMUSING, supra note 25, at 27-29; see also N. POSTMAN, CONSCIEN-
TIOUS, supra note 25, at 172-73 (remarking that the entertaining visual image has replaced the spo-
ken or written word as the primary medium of public discourse).
101. Hall, supra note 81, at 4, col. 1 (quoting Professor Stewart Ewen).
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If our communicative culture is indeed tending toward Huxley's an-
tiutopia, what can or should be done? From a first-amendment vantage
point, how do we deconstruct or reconstruct our television culture? Is it
possible to draw first-amendment lines that will address the distinct
harms posed by Orwellian censorship and Huxleyan triviality in our
amusement world? Against the backdrop of the dancing-pig syndrome
and two-second sound-bites, we proceed to examine these questions.
III. A Rear-View Mirror Look at the First Amendment
We return to McLuhan, and to his metaphor describing how most
people approach the present or future by looking into the "rear-view mir-
ror" 10 2 of the past. The "rear-view mirror" perspective is commonplace
in the law, particularly in first-amendment jurisprudence. Media-law
scholars attempt to transpose the eighteenth-century ideal of freedom of
speech and press10 3 on our modern world as if no changes have taken
place. First-amendment doctrine assumes that governmental censorship
still poses a greater and more real threat to our self-governing ideal than
self-gratification; it assumes that the law that constitutes our system of
free expression, although forged in a revolutionary era, still has meaning
even though the evils against which that law was directed no longer pre-
vail. A first-amendment doctrine based on such assumptions fails to ad-
dress the vulnerability of free expression in the modern, commercial
context of trivialized speech.' ° 4
Clearly, the potential for Orwellian governmental censorship can
never be dismissed.1 0 5 Practically speaking, however, that potential is far
102. M. MCLUHAN & Q. FIORE, WAR AND PEACE IN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE 18 (1968). Ac-
cording to McLuhan's biographer, he frequently employed the
"metaphor he had devised to express what Wyndham Lewis had once taught him: 'The
present cannot be revealed to people until it has become yesterday.' McLuhan termed this
the 'rearview mirror phenomenon.' People went through life looking into the rear-view
mirror-seeing the present in terms of the past-instead of paying attention to the reality
confronting them."
P. MARCHAND, MARSHALL McLUHAN: THE MEDIUM AND THE MESSENGER 209 (1989) (footnote
omitted) (quoting H. KENNER, THE POUND ERA 436 (1971) (quoting Wyndham Lewis)).
103. Here, we do not mean to refer to the narrow and historical conception of the dimensions of
the 1791 guarantee. Rather, we refer to a more generative principle grounded solely in the concern
to prevent an Orwellian type of government-protection against censorial suppression of speech and
press. However elastic or expansive this principle may be, it still does not contemplate the Huxleyan
evil to which we have drawn attention.
104. On a related and important front, Professor M. Ethan Katsh has perceived that "the devel-
opment of new communications technologies places pressure on the law to clarify the purposes of
free expression." Katsh, The First Amendment and Technological Change: The New Media Have a
Message, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1459, 1479-80 (1989) (examining constitutional protections for
electronic information systems, particularly the computer); see also infra note 159.
105. See, e.g., Emerson, The State of the First Amendment as We Enter "1984", in FREEDOM AT
RISK: SECRECY, CENSORSHIP, AND REPRESSION IN THE 1980s 31, 32 (R. Curry ed. 1988) [hereinaf-
ter FREEDOM AT RISK] (arguing that the most urgent problem facing the first amendment is the
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less threatening than it has been in the past. This is not, of course, to
deny the obvious: on a variety of fronts, first-amendment freedom-of-
expression issues continue to surface in cases ranging from flag burn-
ing106 to cable station access. But, comparatively, the Orwellian evil is
not likely to pose a clear and present danger to traditional first-amend-
ment values: in China'0 7 and elsewhere, the censorial hand of the op-
pressor mutes the dissenter who in this nation is increasingly silenced by
an oblivious commercial and entertainment culture.
Must we-and can we-redefine the evil and the enemy of free
speech in an effort to reconcile old-world Orwellian principles with new-
world Huxleyan predicaments? In pursuing such an inquiry, an unfortu-
nate and almost inevitable tendency surfaces toward ideological labeling.
Much of this constitutional discourse is novel and perplexing, and the
reader may be tempted to affix labels to our arguments and to make
hasty conclusions. We urge the reader to avoid labels and to suspend
judgment for several reasons. First, ideological labeling is likely to be
misleading. The attempt to combat the evils of the Huxleyan nightmare
may be stamped as a "conservative" agenda to salvage an elitist ideal in
an otherwise egalitarian society. Yet certainly, "the stupefying effects of
need for secrecy in national security); Koffler, The New Seditious Libel, in FREEDOM AT RISK,
supra, at 140, 146 (arguing that the federal government currently invokes the need for secrecy to
hide its authoritarian measures); Randall, When the Imagination of the Writer Is Confronted by the
Imagination of the State, in FREEDOM AT RISK, supra, at 169, 170 (discussing a writer excluded
from entry to the United States on the basis of views expressed); Schapiro, The Excludables, in
FREEDOM AT RISK, supra, at 162, 164 (citing the United States policy of excluding foreign citizens
on the basis of ideology as limiting free debate); Shattuck, Federal Restrictions on the Free Flow of
Academic Information and Ideas, in FREEDOM AT RISK, supra, at 45, 51 (describing secrecy regula-
tions promulgated to stop publication of scientific research under guise of national security); Stone,
The Reagan Administration, The First Amendment, and FBI Domestic Security Investigations, in
FREEDOM AT RISK, supra, at 272, 273 (arguing that domestic security investigations may become
investigation of dissenters and not subversives); Pell, Kicking Out Palestinians, THE NATION, Feb. 5,
1990, at 167, 167 (1986 National Security Directive "aimed at chilling dissent by foreigners living in
the United States").
106. Interestingly, because of television's imagistic and commercial qualities, contemporary first-
amendment doctrine must respond more frequently to claims of constitutionally protected symbolic
and commercial speech. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2536 (1989) (concerning the
burning of an American flag as a form of political protest); Board of Trustees v. Fox, 109 S. Ct.
3028, 3030 (1989) (concerning the State University of New York's attempt to limit commercial
speech-"Tupperware parties"-within the dormitories of the school).
Consider in relation to the flag-burning case the spectacle of people fighting over images: a
presidential candidate stands in front of a flag factory to assert patriotic leadership; a dissenter burns
a flag to denounce administration policies of nuclear armament; a President responds by proposing
an anti-flag-burning constitutional amendment so that his image will overshadow all dissent. Re-
garding the "Tupperware parties" case, it seems inevitable that in a highly commercial culture, the
marketing of china, crystal, and silverware will be equated with the marketplace of ideas.
107. The Orwellian danger is striking in today's China. See, e.g., Ignatius, Repeat After Me,
Please: War Is Peace, Freedom Is Slavery, Wall St. J., July 20, 1989, at Al, col. 4 (reporting on the
creation of required history classes in China's universities that present the official version of the
democracy movement of 1989).
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consumer capitalism and its mass media"'1 8 cannot be a thing of joy to
either the reformist or radical. Alternatively, the effort to transform the
law to license affirmative government involvement in the system of free
expression may be branded as "progressive" or "socialist" or, in any
case, as antithetical to the tenets of American free enterprise. But no
conservative of integrity and public conscience can extol a culture that
condones self-induced pleasure at the expense of thoughtful self-govern-
ance. The ideological labeling of these arguments serves only to confuse
their substance. Second, hasty verdicts about the validity of such argu-
ments may prevent the reader from inquiring past the labels to determine
whether, indeed, the Huxleyan dangers are a threat to serious discourse.
Finally, the reader who reaches rashly for ideological categories may well
be surprised with what follows in this Article and in our future essays.
Certainly, many have touched upon the application of first-amend-
ment principles to the electronic media, but very few have offered pro-
posals to mediate or eliminate differences in protection of speech based
on the medium of communication. What is striking about the few stud-
ies is the failure to focus on the Orwellian-Huxleyan dichotomy and the
absence of what could be a rich cross-fertilization between constitutional
jurisprudence, on the one hand, and thoughts on the technological attrib-
utes and commercial uses of television on the other. Metaphorically, the
few who have confronted aspects of these issues-like first-amendment
theorists generally-have driven into the future with eyes focused on the
rear-view mirror.
Presently, we can identify three prototypical first-amendment scena-
rios pertaining to the divergence between the old and new media. In
shorthand, these schema may conveniently be titled the classical (aboli-
tionist), modern (libertarian), and reformist (regulatory) scenarios. In
various ways, each scenario is tied to a typographic mindset that biases
its vision of the first-amendment's role in our society. Ultimately, we
find all scenarios to be myopic-though each contains fragments of great
value, none fully gleans the paradox of the first amendment in the age of
paratroopers. The presentation of these scenarios follows immediately.
Part IV critiques these scenarios from the Orwellian-Huxleyan vantage
point developed in Part I.
A. The Classical Scenario
The classical scenario celebrates the Enlightenment philosophy of
108. AMERICAN MEDIA & MASS CULTURE 407 (D. Lazere ed. 1987) [hereinafter AMERICAN
MEDIA] (referring to statement by Alvin Gouldner).
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the eighteenth century-the century in which the first amendment was
born. Classicists hail an educated citizenry as the essential component of
a free society and urge that serious learning requires emphasis on read-
ing, writing, and face-to-face dialogue. The classical vision is collective,
not egocentric. The traditional model of the American town meeting-
citizens coming together, talking about, debating, and resolving issues-
is the embodiment of this ideal. A classical regime champions modera-
tion in all things: self-restraint is the sine qua non of self-governance and
interest in the public good. Antithetical to this objective is the specter of
self-indulgent and alienating consumption. Accordingly, the classical
theorist views unchecked commercialism as a clear and present danger.
The modem mass media, particularly as it filters culture through televi-
sion, imperils the very existence of the classical scheme. As it evokes
from the audience emotional responses to its stimuli, the commercial
electronic media tyrannize the public mind. Thus, at the center of the
classical scenario, rationality, collective decision making, and public dis-
course are united in the doctrine of the first amendment. Any obstacle
to, or interference with, this union is inimical to the principles of the first
amendment and is therefore subject to prohibition.
Professor Alexander Meiklejohn is the leading American actor in
the classical scenario. More than four decades ago, he warned of the
exploitative nature of the mass electronic media; rather than promoting
important first-amendment values of collective decision making, it cor-
rupts and suffocates them:
[T]he total effect [of commercial radio], as judged in terms of edu-
cational value, is one of terrible destruction. The radio ... is not
cultivating those qualities of taste, of reasoned judgment, of integ-
rity, of loyalty, of mutual understanding upon which the enterprise
of self-government depends. On the contrary, it is a mighty force
for breaking them down.109
Consequently, this electronic medium must be denied first-amendment
protection in the very name of the first amendment:
The radio as it now operates among us is not free. Nor is it entitled
to the protection of the First Amendment. It is not engaged in the
task of enlarging and enriching human communication. It is en-
gaged in making money. And the First Amendment does not in-
tend to guarantee men freedom to say what some private interest
pays them to say for its own advantage. 110
Further developing his first-amendment thesis for the electronic media,
Meiklejohn moved with even greater force against commercial television:
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On the whole, the "liberties" of what we call "Free Enterprise"
are, I think, destructive of the "freedoms" of a self-governing soci-
ety. The unregulated self-seeking of the profit-makers is much
more dangerous in its effect upon the morality and intelligence of
the citizen than that participation in regulatory action for the com-
mon good to which free enterprise has so often shown itself hos-
tile. . . . [P]rivately sponsored television has proved to be even
more deadly [than radio]. Those business controls of communica-
tion are, day by day, year by year, destroying and degrading our
intelligence and our taste by the use of instruments which should
be employed in educating and uplifting them." 1
Additionally, and as a corollary, Meiklejohn called for "affirmative"
congressional measures to buttress the classical ideal of freedom of ex-
pression. 1 2 Such affirmative measures seemed particularly necessary be-
cause he believed that laissez-faire economy and technology stirred
modem consumptive tendencies contrary to the classical model of self-
restraint.
More recently, Meiklejohn's thesis has been extended by one of his
intellectual disciples, Professor George Anastaplo. 13 In a little-noticed
but challenging essay,' '4 Anastaplo criticized the effects of television on
the viewing public: its addictive quality, its simplistic portrayal of real-
ity, its threat to civic piety and associational values, its commercial drives
for material consumption, and its detrimental impact on education.
Meiklejohn's thesis leads directly to the abolition of commercial
television:
[I]t has long seemed obvious to me-that the television industry
should be abolished completely in this country, that nothing short
of this can remove its crippling influence from American life. If
this is indeed a society open to experimentation, then let us deliber-
ately experiment for at least a decade with the remedy of complete
suppression of television. 115
111. Id. at xv-xvi.
112. Meiklejohn argued that Congress is empowered to "enlarge and enrich" that "freedom of
mind which befits the members of a self-governing society." Id. at 19. Among his preferred propos-
als, he suggested that Congress enact laws that would bring the citizenry "together in activities of
communication and mutual understanding." Id.
113. See Sharp, Crosskey, Anastaplo, and Meiklejohn on the United States Constitution, 20 U.
CHI. L. SCH. REc. 3, 7 (1973). See generally G. ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTIONALIST: NOTES
ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT 275-77 (1971) (arguing that success of republican government depends
on quality of leadership, which in turn depends on education, and criticizing the caliber of televi-
sion's contribution to mass education).
114. See Anastaplo, supra note 94, at 161-232. Despite our differences with his views, we ac-
knowledge a debt to Professor Anastaplo whose provocative essay initially spawned our interest in
the topics addressed in this and future essays.
115. Id. at 222. For a similar suggestion, see generally J. MANDER, FOUR ARGUMENTS FOR
THE ELIMINATION OF TELEVISION 46 (1977) (arguing that America cannot return to a "sane and
democratic" process unless television is banned).
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Anastaplo advocates governmental regulation of television precisely to
further first-amendment values:
[T]here should be, in ordinary constitutional circumstances, both
an absolute prohibition against previous legal restraints of the press
and an absolute previous restraint (that is, total abolition) of the
television industry....
I see in the abolition of television no serious First Amendment
problem. Rather than abridge the "freedom of speech" guaranteed
by the First Amendment, the abolition of television (and hence a
radical reform of the mass media) would enlarge freedom of speech
among us.... Thus abolition of television would probably contrib-
ute among us to the preservation of self-government and hence
genuine freedom. 16
B. The Modern Scenario
In direct opposition to the classical scenario, the modern scenario' 17
rejects virtually any legal distinction based on the method of communica-
tion as contrary to first-amendment principles. Although it purports to
acknowledge that the operation of new electronic technology has impli-
cations for first-amendment doctrine, the modern scenario does not rec-
ognize any dissimilarities in the effect of different media types, or any
evils that may be special to commercial television. Espousing "liberta-
rian" and "laissez-faire". notions, the modern program dictates a policy
of "hands-off" government. Fixated upon Orwellian fears to the exclu-
sion of all others, the modern scenario highlights the perils of any gov-
ernmental control of the electronic media.
Perhaps the most highly regarded director of this scenario was the
late political science professor, Ithiel de Sola Pool. For the modernist,
116. Anastaplo, supra note 94, at 223-24 (footnotes omitted). Failing complete abolition of com-
mercial television, Anastaplo offers an alternative program. He introduces seven almost equally
provocative suggestions for reform of the electronic medium: curtailment of the amount of daily
television, reduction of commercial advertising influence, encouragement of local programming, lim-
itation of television to strictly entertainment programming, airing of extended civic proceedings (if
politics are to appear), content screening of nonpolitical programs, and encouragement of familial
and communal self-restraint. See id. at 226-28.
117. We do not employ the phrase "modern scenario" to depict the status quo in government
regulation of the electronic media. See T. CARTER, M. FRANKLIN & J. WRIGHT, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND THE FIFTH ESTATE: REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC MASS MEDIA 1-478, 634-
86, 704-48 (1989). The modernist response to the Onvellian-Huxleyan dilemma is largely represen-
tative of today's highly capitalistic and technologically advanced culture. The archetypal character
of the modernist first-amendment response will become more evident in our critique of this scenario
in Part IV. At this point, it is only necessary to appreciate the existing potential for a significant
realization of the modern scenario. Consider, for example, the deregulatory governmental trends
affecting the mass communications industry. See, e.g., Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d
654, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding FCC termination of the "fairness doctrine"); I. DE SOLA POOL,
supra note 66, at 3, 45, 159-60, 221-23, 242-43 (describing the FCC's failed attempts to regulate
computer networks and cable television).
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the "degrading erosion of freedom that our system of communication
faces today"" 8 is alarming:
It would be dire if the laws we make today governing the dominant
mode of information handling in ... an information society were
subversive of its freedom. The onus is on us to determine whether
free societies in the twenty-first century will conduct electronic
communication under the conditions of freedom established for the
domain of print through centuries of struggle, or whether that
great achievement will become lost in a confusion about new
technologies. 119
The modernist120 maintains that two phenomena require the extension of
first-amendment protection to the electronic media:12 first, the increas-
ing use of the same physical apparatuses (wires, cables, airwaves) and
technological formats (telegraph, telephone, television) for electronic
communication; 122 and, second, the growing cross-ownership in commu-
nications industries. 123
These two developments have fostered a "convergence of modes"
that undermines the long-honored rationales for special governmental
control of electronic media.' 2 4  Moreover, the modernist argues that
"[t]he extension of electronic means to do better and faster what the
118. I. DE SOLA POOL, supra note 66, at 4.
119. Id. at 10.
120. Another advocate of nonregulation of the electronic media is Professor Lucas A. Powe, Jr.,
who offers an historical expos& of the political machinations of broadcast regulators. See L. PowE,
AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 6-7 (1987).
121. Professor de Sola Pool's discussion of electronic media, though directed to television, en-
compassed all modes of electronic communication facing the actuality or potentiality of governmen-
tal regulation. See I. DE SOLA PooL, supra note 66, at 1-10.
122. Id. at 23-42. Professor de Sola Pool summarizes this point as follows:
A single physical means-be it wires, cables, or airwaves-may carry services that in the
past were provided in separate ways. Conversely, a service that was provided in the past by
any one medium-be it broadcasting, the press, or telephony--can now be provided in
several different physical ways. So the one-to-one relationship that used to exist between a
medium and its use is eroding. That is what is meant by the convergence of modes.
Id. at 23. For an expression of a similar concern, see S. BRAND, THE MEDIA LAB 214-19 (1987).
See also Gilder, Forget HDTV It's Already Outmoded, N.Y. Times, May 28, 1989, § 3, at 3, col. 2
(discussing the development of the "telecomputer, which couples digital and video technology and
fiber optics").
123. See I. DE SOLA POOL, supra note 66, at 42-54. Professor de Sola Pool concludes:
More often than not ... the bars on cross-ownership have proved ineffective. Despite
government attempts to prevent it, cross-ownership reinforces a convergence among modes
that is drastically changing the structure and legal status of communications industries.
Neither competition among modes nor convergence between them is new; what is new is
the scope of the convergence.
Id. at 53; see also Fabrikant, Time Inc Takes Control of Warner Within Hours of Court Approval,
N.Y. Times, July 25, 1989, at 1, col. 1 (describing a merger that created one of the largest communi-
cations and entertainment companies in the world).
124. Consistent with the current trend in deregulation of the communications media, de Sola
Pool's modernist concerns are echoed in a special report of the Congressional Office of Technology




older modes of communication did with lead, ink, and paper" requires
that the modern electronic format receive a "newer tradition" of protec-
tion from governmental control equal to that developed over the centu-
ries for the press. 125 In the modern first-amendment society, any official
campaign to combat Huxleyan evils through governmental regulation
paves the way of tyranny.
C. The Reformist Scenario
The reformist scenario is situated almost midpoint between the
classical and modernist extremes, essentially advocating limited regula-
tion of television rather than its abolition. Like its classical counterpart,
the reformist heralds certain governmental actions as essential to the
preservation of core first-amendment norms. Without affirmative gov-
ernment involvement, the reformist predicts that corporate commercial
interests will select programs based on advertising objectives alone, and
that the unchecked laissez-faire market will produce a concentration of
media ownership. Although the reformists are concerned with the en-
lightenment and communal values of the first amendment, they are more
concerned with the amendment's potential to redistribute political and
economic power in the media context.
The reformist scenario contains a subtle understanding of commer-
cial television and the Huxleyan dilemma, but reformists are loath to
admit to the disquieting implications of that knowledge. Like their mod-
ernist counterparts, the reformists tolerate a realm of virtually deregu-
lated commercial broadcasting, presumably to avoid charges of
Orwellian government rule. Ultimately, this agenda places a guarded
faith in the media's ability to save itself, in democracy's ability to patrol
its self-indulgent behavior, in the public's ability to understand its best
interest, and in the nation's ability to transform an altogether mass media
into a more local one. What this faith also presupposes is the active and
knowing participation of the citizenry in a reformist enterprise.
The reformist, nevertheless, rails against a powerful commercial
broadcast industry that "continues to push for fewer obligations to the
general public, while focusing programming efforts toward attracting an
audience that maximizes its advertising revenue." 126 Reformists regard
the right of public access to the airwaves as a necessity, "not simply from
a need to improve the 'vast wasteland' of television programming,"' 127
but also "to foster the development of a vast array of programming op-
125. I. DE SOLA POOL, supra note 66, at 54.
126. Nader & Riley, supra note 8, at 6-7 (footnotes omitted).
127. Id. at 7 (footnote omitted).
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tions from the maximum number of different sources.... The public-
not government or corporate broadcasters or networks-should be given
the opportunity to choose programs directly and to define what is in its
own interest."1 28
An innovative contemporary expression of the reformist agenda is
found in a recent article1 29 by Ralph Nader 130 and Claire Riley. 31 The
authors propose the federal statutory adoption of "Audience Net-
work," 1 32 a national, nonprofit membership organization, funded by dues
and voluntary private contributions. "Audience Network" would be al-
lowed free prime-time access on all television and radio channels for pub-
lic interest broadcasting:
Audience Network is a proposal designed to reestablish the first
amendment rights of the public. It would provide systematic pub-
lic access to and programming experience over the airwaves, as
well as better public representation in the regulation of over-the-air
broadcasting.... It would use [prime-time] to develop and air pro-
grams the membership wants on the airwaves and to educate the
public about Audience Network's operation and broadcast regula-
tion issues. Audience Network would also represent viewers' inter-
ests before the FCC, Congress and the courts.133
The overarching objective of Audience Network is "to put daily, civic
function behind the principle that information is the currency of
democracy."134
The three approaches for reconciling the first amendment with to-
day's commercial television-what we label as classical, modern, and re-
formist scenarios-all fall victim to the rear-view mirror predicament in
some way. We cannot move into the future by freezing the first amend-
ment in its eighteenth-century enlightenment mindset, by applying the
first amendment as if the biases and dangers of commercial television did
not exist, or by styling the first amendment as if the public craving for
entertainment will not affect reform efforts. Moving into the future re-
quires an appreciation of a paradox not played out in any of the scena-
rios. Against the scenery of the classical, modern, and reformist
programs, we now discuss the paradox of the first amendment in the age
of paratroopers.
128. Id. at 7-9.
129. See id. at 1-86.
130. Founder and director of the Center for Study of Responsive Law.
131. Washington, D.C., public-interest lawyer.
132. In fact, Nader and Riley append a detailed model statute for the creation of Audience
Network. See Nader & Riley, supra note 8, at 87-125.
133. Id. at 4. For a discussion of an earlier and similar proposal, see Cirino, An Alternative
American Communications System, in AMERICAN MEDIA, supra note 108, at 568, 568-76.
134. Nader & Riley, supra note 8, at 86.
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IV. The Paratroopers' Paradox
A paradox: An apparently contradictory proposition that may nev-
ertheless be true. The paradox: The first amendment cannot save itself
without destroying itself.
Our Orwellian-Huxleyan circumstance is the crucible in which the
paratroopers' paradox is formed. The eighteenth-century first amend-
ment, with its emphasis on serious public discourse and its adherence to
an anticensorial maxim, can no longer coexist with the self-indulgent
bent of a mass entertainment culture. In order to protect this traditional
vision, the first amendment must be recast to distinguish between old and
new forms of media. 135 But, once the government is empowered to regu-
late expression on commercial television, the old first-amendment specter
of censorial oppression resurfaces. First-amendment protection collapses
into first-amendment tyranny.
Yet, to preserve the conditions for self-defined liberty and to pro-
mote the corollary anticensorial idea, the modern first amendment must
be recast to protect all forms of media without distinction. But un-
leashing the drives for self-amusement and for commercial corporate
gains, the electronic first amendment debases the values of meaningful
public discourse, effective dissent, and collective decision making, all in
the service of a new mass culture. First-amendment liberty collapses into
first-amendment triviality.
With an eye to avoiding the paradox, the natural desire is to navi-
gate the first amendment between the Orwellian Scylla and Huxleyan
Charybdis. Such compromise seeks to preserve the ideals of the tradi-
tional vision while averting censorship, and to concede the reign of the
modern vision while stemming triviality. Yielding to two media masters
may have unsettling consequences. To be effectual, elevated public dis-
course must survive and flourish on a leveling commercial medium wed
to pleasure. First-amendment compromise collapses into first-amend-
ment ineffectiveness.
As the careful reader may have already gleaned, 136 this summary of
the paradox sets the stage for our critique of the three scenarios sketched
in Part III. The classical scenario invites tyranny, the modern scenario
embraces triviality, and the reformist scenario endures ineffectiveness-
135. To some extent, the first amendment already recognizes differences between modes of ex-
pression, as evidenced by the use of distinct terms for freedom of "speech" and of the "press." Some
have argued that this difference should be determinative. See, e.g., Stewart, "Or of the Press", 26
HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633-34 (1975) (excerpt of Address by Potter Stewart, Yale Law School Sesqui-
centennial Convocation (Nov. 2, 1974)).
136. We direct our less careful reader to Appendix B.
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to understand this is to cross the Rubicon. 137 We have, then, only to
jump?
A. Classicism Critiqued
Classicists cannot suffer the idea: the world of Faneuil Hall is
gone. 138 The classical scenario strives to return to this world. The classi-
cists' love for the past infuses in them a romanticism that is at war with
reality. They reach for the future by returning to the past. At this junc-
ture, the classicists confront the paradox.
In focusing on the past, the classicists do not appreciate that the
television culture that they abhor is part and parcel of a larger mass com-
mercial culture; the ideal of the "marketplace of ideas" now operates
within a vast commercial marketplace of which television is only a part.
However appealing their polemical call for the abolition of television, it
cannot possibly provide an answer to the first-amendment paradox. To
indict commercial television is to indict our culture-perhaps even the
entire American democratic regime. 139 The classicist argument, when
removed from the particulars of the first amendment and applied to the
generalities of culture and government in America, becomes hyperbole.
Its agenda, then, is intended more for shock value than as a serious pro-
posal for change. Of course, its shock value exposes its futility.
The classical crusade to return to the past invites government action
137. Again, crossing the Rubicon means understanding the differences between the Orwellian
and Huxleyan forms of tyranny, and appreciating the difficulties of developing first-amendment
principles to suit an electronic entertainment medium. Those who attempt this venture are the first-
amendment paratroopers who cross the Rubicon-and then jump?
138. Popularly known as America's "Cradle of Liberty," Faneuil Hall was constructed in 1742
and served as a meeting place for debates in opposition to the Sugar Tax of 1764 and the Stamp Act
of 1765. In the next century, Faneuil Hall provided a forum for speakers such as Frederick
Douglass and Susan B. Anthony. See R. BEARSE, MASSACHUsETrS: A GUIDE To THE PILGRIM
STATE 198 (2d ed. 1971). Today, Faneuil Hall is the centerpiece of an urban shopping mall.
139. In this regard, is not Allan Bloom's attack on higher education really an indictment of the
American democratic regime per se? See A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THEAMERICAN MIND 25-
43, 243-382 (1987). Not surprisingly, the classicist must register a dissent to Bloom's larger thesis.
See, e.g., Anastaplo, In re Allan Bloom: A Respectful Dissent, in ESSAYS ON The Closing of the
American Mind 267, 267, 272, 275, 284 n.5 (R. Stone ed. 1989) [hereinafter American Mind] (criti-
cizing Bloom for shoddy research and factual errors); Colmo, Allan Bloom and the American Prem-
ise, in American Mind, supra, at 154, 154-57 (arguing that Bloom attacks the modem notion of self
without substituting another definition); Drury, Allan Bloom and the Charms of Culture, in Ameri-
can Mind, supra, at 158, 158-65 (arguing that Bloom presents a choice between the extremes of a
closed society or cultural anarchy); Jaffa, Humanizing Certitudes and Impoverished Doubts: A Cri-
tique of The Closing of the American Mind, in American Mind, supra, at 129, 129-53 (arguing that
Bloom misapplies the lessons of the classics to American society); Kesler, The Closing of Allan
Bloom's Mind: An Instant Classic Reconsidered, in American Mind, supra, at 174, 174-80 (arguing
that Bloom places too much emphasis on the role of American universities in the development of
American culture); West, Allan Bloom and America, in American Mind, supra, at 166, 166-74 (not-




so abhorrent to the contemporary citizen as to be nothing less than des-
potic. The total abolition of television or even regulation approximating
this goal1 4° would be viewed as the segue to an aristocratic (and, there-
fore, un-American) displacement of egalitarian and mass tastes. As the
polemical Professor Postman observed in his critique of the polemical
classicist:
Americans will not shut down any part of their technological appa-
ratus, and to suggest that they do so is to make no suggestion at all.
It is almost equally unrealistic to expect that nontrivial modifica-
tions in the availability of media will ever be made. Many civilized
nations limit by law the amount of hours television may operate
and thereby mitigate the role television plays in public life. But I
believe that this is not a possibility in America. Once having
opened the Happy Medium to full public view, we are not likely to
countenance even its partial closing. 141
With a nation of Americans unwilling to budge from their television sets,
the classical vision is doomed. Tersely put, we cannot get to their world
from here.142
For the classical scenario to achieve any real measure of success
without resort to Orwellian tyranny, two concepts of traditional first-
amendment jurisprudence would have to be redefined: first, the concept
of censorship, and, second, the character of the perceived enemy to free
expression. To empower the government with a high level of authority
to regulate commercial television programming, certain forms of censor-
ship must fall outside the first amendment. The speech and press clauses
must be narrowed to justify governmental "suppression" of commercial
television expression. Further, the classicists must elevate the Huxleyan
tyranny over Orwellian tyranny as the greater enemy of free speech. Yet,
armed with a redefined first amendment, the paratroopers' paradox
opens a Pandora's box. The classicists are apt to invoke the first amend-
ment as a sword against private commercialism which assaults their no-
tion of freedom of expression. 143 Among other things, once the classical
140. See Anastaplo, supra note 94, at 223-28; see also Programs Urge Viewers To Turn Off Their
Sets, N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1989, at D18, col. 3 (noting that one San Francisco public broadcasting
station airs a children's program during the summer which encourages them to turn off the televi-
sion and read so that they do not lose important academic gains during the summer months).
141. N. POSTMAN, AMUSING, supra note 25, at 158.
142. See generally Schlag, An Appreciative Comment on Coase's The Problem of Social Cost" A
Viewfrom the Left, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 919, 960 (asserting that "idealized visions lead to the you-
can't-get-there-from-here problem").
143. From this perspective, the conservative classical agenda resembles that of its radical coun-
terpart. Interestingly, both would empower government to contain the drives of corporate commer-
cialism; of course, they would do so for distinct, perhaps contradictory, reasons. The combined
force of the ideological right and left may well threaten the hegemony of conventional constitutional
doctrine in this area.
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agenda places an entire communications industry outside the first
amendment's boundaries, it must then allow for a hierarchy of protec-
tions based on the commercial or noncommercial character of expression
or its technological medium.144
Curiously, the classicists' indictment of the status quo overlooks an
important cyclical principle of the past: the commercial television me-
dium, which the classicists so abjure, merely replaced a commercial oral
predecessor, the radio, which in turn replaced another commercial prede-
cessor, typography. Of course, classicists do not appear to abhor the ef-
fects of the typographic medium, which replaced its scribal predecessor,
or the scribal medium, which replaced its oral predecessor.145 Yet, each
of these transitions exacted its own toll from the fullness of the social and
psychological experience that was represented by the preceding mode of
communication. 146 From the vantage point of the critic of the typo-
graphic culture, for example, print artificially reduced and abstracted the
world to the cold confines of the typed page.' 47
144. What would the classicist do with commercial print ventures, like the newspaper USA To-
day or People magazine?
145. In antiquity, commercial oral speech was the province of sophists, whom the classicists
likewise abhorred.
146. See, eg., E. HAVELOCK, THE MUSE LEARNS TO WRITE 9 (1986) (noting that a wealth of
detail and depth of psychological feeling of non-Greek culture was lost when orality was trans-
formed into literacy); E. HAVELOCK, ORIGINS OF WESTERN LITERACY 6 (1976) (arguing that writ-
ten language fails to fulfill the full potential of oral language); E. HAVELOCK, PROLOGUE TO GREEK
LITERACY 4 (1971) (noting that the creative process of oral-historical embellishment by successive
bards ended in Greece when the Greek alphabet was invented); M. McLUHAN, supra note 44, at 48
(characterizing the alphabet as an aggressive absorber and transformer of cultures); W. ONG, ORAL-
ITY AND LITERACY 10-15 (1982) (noting that once writing took possession of the psyche of oral
cultures, the production of highly artistic and beautiful verbal performance was no longer possible);
W. ONG, THE PRESENCE OF THE WORD 18 (1967) (noting that it was impossible to understand the
psychological and cultural significance of oral expression contrasted with writing and print, until we
moved into the present age of telephonic and electronic communication); W. ONG, RAMUS,
METHOD, AND THE DECAY OF DIALOGUE 307-14 (1958) (discussing the implications for modern
cultures of letterpress printing and of Ramism, which views the elements of dialogue and all expres-
sion as letters rather than sounds).
147. We discuss these, and other points, in our forthcoming essays, Electronic Texts and Death
of Discourse, and in Collins, Writing on Writing.
For the classicists to deny the proposition noted in the text, they would have to obscure the
paradox latent in the union of the warring typographic and oral traditions. The advent of ty-
pography raised its own form of the paratroopers' paradox in its time: orality could not save itself
without destroying itself, because the word, in order to be effective, had to "speak" its case in print.
On a somewhat related score, we find it curious that the new critics of legal studies devote such
great attention to the interpretation of texts. Although purporting to represent the cause of "new
voices" or "other voices," they seem deaf to the oral. Put differently, is not the real problem with
the Langdellian method more one of its format than its content? Should not the new critics question
the continued use of texts in classes? Would not the return to the oral be entirely consistent with the




The modem scenario is single-value-based. Liberty is championed
for its own sake and is largely divorced from other traditional first-
amendment values. Essentially, the modernist understands the first
amendment as a vehicle for individualism, rather than as an instrument
for any public good. The modem scenario favorably portrays society as a
collection of atomistic beings-a society in which the first amendment
preserves the conditions necessary for self-interested behavior. 148 In
Plato's words, it is "the city full of freedom and free speech" where there
is "license" for all modes of expression.149 As a laissez-faire theory, the
modem scenario is ideally suited to the consumptive desires of a highly
capitalistic and technologically driven society.t 50
Modernists flatly reject the notion that the "new pleasure principle"
of the commercial television culture is problematic. If anything, they
view it in a positive rather than a negative light. Modernists do not im-
agine the Huxleyan evil as a threat to the system of free expression-to
them, acting as if it were a threat is the real threat.
The felt need of modernists to extend first-amendment protections
unsparingly to commercial television reveals their hypersensitivity to the
fears of Orwellian tyranny. Not surprisingly, the Orwellian fear makes
the modernist acutely aware that the first amendment cannot remain
static in the face of dynamic changes in modes of communication. Un-
fortunately, the modernist is unaware that the first amendment likewise
cannot remain static when triviality and amusement threaten to become
the criteria for public discourse.
Surely, the value of freedom of expression cannot be confined to an
unchecked liberty interest. By attempting to safeguard the single an-
ticensorial tenet of the traditional first amendment, the modernist allows
other values to be destroyed, 15 1 either by governmental indifference or by
148. See generally E. WOLGAST, THE GRAMMAR OF JUSTICE 1-76 (1987) (describing "social
atomism" as the view that society is composed of a collection of independent, self-motivated enti-
ties); Collins & Skover, The Future ofLiberal Legal Scholarship, 87 MICH. L. REV. 189, 221 (1988)
(attributing to classical liberal legalism the philosophy that "the individual [was] a free, rational, and
autonomous agent who was both the source of political authority and the ultimate justification for its
exercise"); id. at 220-37 (discussing criticism of the contemporary liberal legal emphasis on individ-
ual-rights consciousness).
149. See PLATO, supra note 63, at 235.
150. See supra note 117.
151. As Professor Steven Shiffrin aptly notes, when expression is justified for atomistic self-
gratification, it is "likely to promote individualist alienation and to discourage civic virtue. More
directly to the point, it is likely to promote a privatized nonengaged citizenry. So while American
educators encourage persons to participate in the body politic as 'citizen-critics,' American television
teaches people to be hedonistic consumers." S. SHIFFRIN, supra note 3. On a related matter, Profes-
sor Todd Gitlin observes:
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corporate design. Professor Frederick Schauer, criticizing Pool's mod-
ernist theory, doubts "whether free speech interests are necessarily
strengthened by the broadening of the first amendment. We cannot ig-
nore the extent to which an extension may be conducive to dilution." 152
His doubts are well-founded.
Once the "new pleasure principle" is unleashed, the cultural envi-
ronment erodes all other important first-amendment values. For exam-
ple, effective dissent requires a social climate in which its message can be
appreciated and acted upon; worthwhile civic participation requires a cit-
izenry that elects to do more than ingest television's soma tablets; an
enlightened search for the common good requires more than atomistic
desires for entertainment. Tracking Huxley's larger point, the modernist
libertarian concept of first-amendment freedoms equates "the lowest pas-
sions with the highest ideals."
153
Finally, as Pool perceived, the increasing convergence among forms
of communication creates an overlap among the technologies and uses of
oral, typographic, and electronic media. Granting the point, conver-
gence of past and present modes of expression does not dictate the exten-
sion of past forms of first-amendment protections to all present and
future forms. 154 Carte-blanche application of the first amendment, with-
out accounting for the different technological attributes and special com-
mercial uses of television, would protect past, nonelectronic forms of
communication as they are corrupted by the new medium. For example,
the oral discourse which was the life force of eighteenth-century revolu-
tionary and nineteenth-century radical protests at Boston's Faneuil Hall
is fundamentally altered when communicated via a staged and "sound-
bite" medium. Convergence notwithstanding, one should pause before
equating the two forms of discourse for first-amendment purposes.
C. Reformism Critiqued
The reformist scenario is, at heart, a laudable one. After all, the
reformists fight the good fight. Facing a mass culture obsessed with the
[I~f we are serious about living in a democracy, the fundamental responsibility of the media
should be to help people better pursue their rights and obligations as citizens, not to sell
goods,... or sprinkle flakes of celebrity and blips of disconnected fact upon the daily life of
a society otherwise dedicated to private gain. Democracy requires an active, engaged citi-
zenry committed to determining and seeking the public good. As it is, the bulk of commer-
cial television.., reminds us to think of ourselves as consumers first and foremost.
T. GITLIN, supra note 2, at 334.
152. Schauer, Free Speech and the Demise of the Soapbox (Book Review), 84 COLUM. L. REV.
558, 565 (1984).
153. A. HUXLEY, supra note 23, at 41.
154. See Schauer, supra note 152, at 569.
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entertainment fare fed to it by the captains of corporate media, the re-
formists pin their faith on the good sense of the citizenry and the media's
ability to rise above itself. They do not resort to the censor's heavy hand,
thereby rejecting the most odious aspects of the modem and classical
scenarios. In this sense, reformists appear to grasp the paratroopers'
paradox.
Yet, their compromise position prompts us to reconsider the ear-
nestness of their first-amendment objectives. Although it espouses a
platform for media education, the reformist agenda appears more polit-
ical than educational, more of fourteenth-amendment equality than of
first-amendment rationality. What animates the reformist is the desire to
reallocate media power, to wrestle prime time from the commercial
"haves," and to place it in the hands of the public "have-nots." The
power exchange, on closer examination, may achieve little else. 15
5
The public appetite for self-amusement that feeds on the status quo
will inevitably corrupt or destroy the reformist educational agenda. For
example, once the reformists have created their Audience Network to
caution the public to the dangers of commercial broadcasting, the ques-
tion will be: Who wants to watch it?156 On the one hand, if its entertain-
ment value cannot compete with the commercial marketplace, it most
likely will fail for lack of mass interest. On the other hand, if its en-
tertainment value is truly competitive, it will undermine its own en-
deavor to educate the public on media ecology.157
If the town-meeting media fails to educate, is there any first-amend-
155. This is not to deny, apart from the first-amendment context, the importance of the relation-
ship between media and power. See, eg., H. INNIS, THE BIAS OF COMMUNICATION 3-32 (1951)
(assessing the refinement of printing as hastening the rise of nationalism, savagery, and revolution in
the twentieth century); C. MILLS, POWER, POLITICS, AND PEOPLE 577-98 (1963) (arguing that sud-
den advances in communication technology destabilize society); C. MILLS, supra note 65 (arguing
that centralization of the expression of opinion and the difficulty of the individual to answer, com-
bine to grant power to those who control the instruments of communication).
156. In McLuhanesque terms, perhaps this is a case of imposing a "hot" message on a "cool"
medium-television. See M. MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA 36-45 (1964); Marchand, supra
note 102, at 140-42, 150, 168-69.
157. See N. POSTMAN, AMUSING, supra note 25, at 159 (arguing that television is most danger-
ous when it "co-opts serious modes of discourse-news, politics, science, education, commerce, reli-
gion-and turns them into entertainment packages"). Postman calls for education in the schools
regarding what information is and how it gives direction to our culture, presumably in a nonelec-
tronic format. See id. at 160. Consistent with Postman's larger theme, there is the danger that
electronic education will undermine the educational process. See Goodman, Are Commercials in the
Classroom Causefor Alarm?, N.Y. Times, June 18, 1989, at H27, col. 1; Verhovek, supra note 7, at 1,
col. 6; Innerst, Turner Bids for Young Minds with Free TVNews, Wash. Times, Apr. 27, 1989, at A6,
col. 1; cf Rosen, Classroom TV Can Become a Lesson in Media Criticism, L.A. Times, Mar. 12,
1989, § 5, at 5, col. 1. For a descriptive account of the educational media efforts of Whittle Commu-
nications, see China, Debut of Commercials on School TV Renews Debate Over Shows' Value, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 6, 1990, at AIS, col. 1; Donohoe, Whittle Carves Out a Niche in Media, Wash. Times,
July 19, 1989, at El, col. 5.
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ment justification for grabbing a piece of the new media pie? If they were
candid, the reformists would likely retort: "As long as we are on the
screen, we are doing something." Ironically, this response dismisses all
that ever mattered in the classical scenario, which informed the reform-
ist's high educational mission, and blindly accepts the modem scenario's
operative principle-media for media's sake. Essentially, the acquisition
of media power has no meaningful first-amendment purpose. If the
power exchange alone is meaningful, it is only in a formalistic sense.
This formalism renders the reformists powerless to mediate between
the classical and the modem scenarios. Once the reformists are stripped
of their serious educational objectives, they come dangerously close to
the triviality that permeates the modem scenario. The reformists may
have grasped the paratroopers' paradox, but they have not escaped it.
The paratroopers' paradox has survived the classical, modem, and
reformist scenarios. Because the paradox remains, each scenario will
continue to perplex its respective audience-and well it should. As long
as each scenario fails to capture the larger play of forces among them all,
its adherents will not understand the fullness of the dizzying paradox.
Understanding the paradox, we must admit, creates a profound con-
flict in our first-amendment jurisprudence. The fundamental tenets of
the traditional first amendment-its anticensorial command and its pub-
lic discourse rationale-suggest two different directions for governmental
action. With regard to abridging speech, its operative principle is both
hands-off and hands-on.
Indeed, Huxley understood the magnitude of the paradox and its
constitutional significance:
The best of constitutions and preventive laws will be powerless
against the steadily increasing pressures of ... advancing technol-
ogy. The constitutions will not be abrogated and the good laws
will remain on the statute book; but these liberal forms will merely
serve to mask and adom a profoundly illiberal substance.15 8
Huxley and the paradox challenge us to consider: How do we empower
the first amendment? Must we-and can we-recast the first amend-
ment to reconcile old-world Orwellian principles with new-world
Huxleyan predicaments? Do we really wish to act upon the knowledge
of the paradox?
Facing the paradox without resolving it, we offer the following (non-
exhaustive) possibilities for future analysis:
158. A. HUXLEY, supra note 23, at 90-91. In the comment quoted above, Huxley confronted a
similar and larger paradox, involving the dissipated power of constitutions and protective legislation
in the face of pressures of propaganda, overpopulation, and over-bureaucratization.
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(1) Investigate the viability of either fortifying rationality, civic
participation, and meaningful dissent rationales for the first
amendment, or substituting some form of a self-gratification ra-
tionale, or attempting to draw lines between these two rationales.
(2) Investigate the viability of a first-amendment doctrine that dis-
tinguishes protections on a combination of factors: the form of
communication (oral, print, electronic); 159 the extent of commer-
cial influence; the "mass" character of the expression (speaker-au-
dience ratio); and the existence of alternative traditional,
noncommercial forms of expression (remember: The "new plea-
sure principle" suffuses the American culture generally, and is only
most blatantly manifest in commercial television).
(3) Investigate the viability of empowering and requiring national
and state governments to take affirmative steps to protect tradi-
tional forms of noncommercial expression: government-sponsored
television; government-sponsored public fora for face-to-face de-
bates, lectures, readings, recitals, and art exhibitions; government-
sponsored media education programs.
(4) Investigate how other countries, particularly socialist nations
without a "first amendment," confront the Huxleyan dilemmas.
Should we choose to act on our knowledge of the paradox, and
should we attempt to recast the first amendment to grapple with the par-
adox, there undoubtedly will be something lost and something gained.
Whether the something lost or the something gained will render us bet-
ter-off or worse-off cannot be resolved at this point. This uncertainty
results in part because the Huxleyan factor has not yet become a variable
in the constitutional calculus of the first amendment, and the full ramifi-
cations of grappling with the paradox remain wholly speculative.
160
For now, our paratroopers are assailed by a cloud of paradoxical
bullets as they cross the Rubicon and prepare to leap into the new first-
amendment terrain. And this all points to the Death of Discourse. But
that, of course, is another battle, another call for hope, and another
article.
159. Insightfully, Professor M. Ethan Katsh predicts the probability of format-specific first-
amendment doctrines in an electronic age. See Katsh, supra note 104, at 1483-85. See generally M.
KATSH, THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW 113-67 (1989) (noting that
the advent of new technology demands clarification of the purpose of free expression).
160. "'We're in unmapped territory,'" observed Bill Moyers, "'where the image is the domi-
nant grammar of our public conversation, and we're not even sure how to think about it.'" Hall,
supra note 81, at 4, col. 1 (statement of Moyers).
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Appendix A
Paratroopers' Reading List
To assist in furthering discourse on the Orwellian-Huxleyan para-
dox of the first amendment, we suggest the following foundational read-
ings which, in our estimation, deserve some place in the curriculum of
any course on the freedom of expression:
Anastaplo, Self-Government and the Mass Media, in THE MASS MEDIA
AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 161 (H. Clor ed. 1974).
T. GITLIN, INSIDE PRIME TIME (1985).
A. HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1965).
A. HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD REVISITED (1958).
A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POW-
ERS OF THE PEOPLE (1960).
C. MILLS, THE POWER ELITE (1956).
Nader & Riley, Oh, Say Can You See: A Broadcast Network for the Audi-
ence, 5 J.L. & POL. 1 (1988).
G. ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
N. POSTMAN, AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH (1985).
N. POSTMAN, TEACHING AS A CONSERVING ACTIVITY (1979).
Schauer, Free Speech and the Demise of the Soap-Box, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 558 (1984).




For our less careful reader who does not wish to be burdened by text:
"Hey, do you want to be on the news tonight or not? This
is a sound bite, not the Gettysburg Address. Just say
what you have to say, Senator, and get the hell off."
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